Promax Development Corporation v. Matt Mattson and Sherie Mattson : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1996
Promax Development Corporation v. Matt
Mattson and Sherie Mattson : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Rex E. Madesn; Korey D. Rasmussen; David L. Pinkston; Snow, Christensen and Martineau;
Attorneys for Appellant.
Steven C. Russell; G. Brent Smith; Affordable Legal Advocates; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Promax Development Corporation v. Mattson, No. 960684 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/491
UTAH COURT OF APMEAi* 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 









MATT MATTSON and SHERIE 
MATTSON, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Case No. 960227 9£> 0 (>/</ ~ Of 
Oral Argument 
Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court 
for Salt Lake County, Utah, Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
STEVEN C. RUSSELL 
G. BRENT SMITH 
AFFORDABLE LEGAL ADVOCATES 
180 South 300 West, Suite 170 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorney for Appellee 
REX E. MADSEN (A2052) 
KOREY D. RASMUSSEN (A6129) 
DAVID L. PINKSTON (A6630) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Attorneys for Appellant 
F I L E 
CLERK SUPREME COURT 
UTAH 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
PROMAX DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION, Case No. 960227 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
MATT MATTSON and SHERIE 
MATTSON, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court 
for Salt Lake County, Utah, Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
REX E. MADSEN (A2052) 
KOREY D. RASMUSSEN (A6129) 
DAVID L. PINKSTON (A6630) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Attorneys for Appellant 
STEVEN C. RUSSELL 
G. BRENT SMITH 
AFFORDABLE LEGAL ADVOCATES 
180 South 300 West, Suite 170 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorney for Appellee 
Oral Argument 
Priority 15 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
A. Nature of the Case 3 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition of the Case Below 4 
C. Statement of Facts 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 12 
I. THE OFFER TO PURCHASE THE MATTSONS' HOME EXPIRED 
WITHOUT BEING ACCEPTED BY THE MATTSONS 12 
II. NO VALID CONTRACT EXISTED FOR THE SALE OF THE 
MATTSON HOME 12 
III. THE MECHANIC'S LIENS WERE FILED AFTER THE OFFER TO 
PURCHASE THE MATTSONS' HOME EXPIRED 13 
IV. THE COURT'S RULING THAT THE MECHANIC'S LIENS WERE 
WRONGFULLY FILED IS INCORRECT AS A MATTER OF LAW 13 
V. EVEN IF THERE WERE A VALID CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF 
THE MATTSON HOME. PHIL BATES DID NOT CAUSE THE SALE 
TO FAIL 14 
VI. EVEN IF MR. BATES WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FAILED 
SALE OF THE MATTSON HOME. THE $170.000 AWARD IS 
EXCESSIVE 14 
VII. THE CONTRACT BETWEEN PROMAX AND THE MATTSONS WAS 
THAT PROMAX WOULD BUILD THE MATTSONS' HOME FOR 
COST PLUS $10.000 15 
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE 16 
IX. RULE 59fal UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. ALLOWS THE 
TRIAL COURT TO TAKE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE 17 
ARGUMENT 18 
I. THE OFFER TO PURCHASE THE MATTSONS' HOME EXPIRED 
WITHOUT BEING ACCEPTED BY THE MATTSONS 18 
II. NO VALID CONTRACT EXISTED FOR THE SALE OF THE 
MATTSON HOME 19 
III. THE MECHANIC'S LIENS WERE FILED AFTER THE OFFER TO 
PURCHASE THE MATTSONS' HOME EXPIRED 21 
IV. THE MECHANIC'S LIENS WERE VALID AND PROPER 22 
V. EVEN IF THERE WERE A VALID CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF 
THE MATTSON HOME. PHIL BATES DID NOT CAUSE THE SALE 
TO FAIL 24 
VI. EVEN IF MR. BATES WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FAILED 
SALE OF THE MATTSON HOME. THE $170.000 AWARD IS 
EXCESSIVE 25 
VII. THE CONTRACT BETWEEN PROMAX AND THE MATTSONS WAS 
THAT PROMAX WOULD BUILD THE MATTSONS' HOME FOR 
COST PLUS $10.000 28 
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE 34 
A. The Court Misinterpreted the Cost Breakdown (Exhibit 2\) for the 
Mattson Home 34 
-ii-
B. The Mattsons Did Not Ask for a Written Contract 34 
C. The Court Misinterpreted Mr. Barraclough's Testimony 35 
D. The Value of the Home at Completion Was Far in Excess 
of $390.000 36 
E. Change Orders Do Not Need To Be Written 36 
F. The Court's Ruling Regarding the Failed Sale of the Mattson 
Home Was Clearly Erroneous 36 
G. The Mattsons Never Accepted the Johnsens' Offer to 
Purchase Their Home 37 
H. Making a Demand for Payment Is Not a Pre-requisite to Filing a 
Mechanic's Lien 37 
I. The Sale of the Mattson Home Did Not Fail Because of the 
Mechanic's Liens 38 
J. The Court Miscalculated the Cost Overruns 38 
K. The Court Misconstrued Culley Davis' Testimony 38 
L. The Court Improperly Ruled That The Parties Stipulated 
That There Were Cost Overruns 39 
IX. RULE 59(a). UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. ALLOWS THE 







Trial Transcript Exerpts 
Court's Oral Ruling 
-iii-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES: 
Albin v. Illinois. 277 111. App. 3d 50, 660 N.E.2d 994 (1995) 41 
Bountiful v. Rilev. 784 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1989) 3 
Christenson v. Jewkes. 761 P.2d 1375 (Utah, 1988) 2 
Consolidated Electric Distributors. Inc. v. Jepson Electric Contracting. Inc.. 
537 P.2d 80 (Or. 1975) 22, 23 
First Security Mortgage Company v. Hansen. 631 P.2d 919 (Utah 1981) 23 
Gillmor v. Wright. 850 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993) 25 
Gravson Roper Limited Partnership v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467 (Utah 1989) 2 
Hansen v. Stewart. 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1989) 3 
In re Cook. 527 A.2d 1115 (Pa. 1987) 25, 41 
In re Marriage of Clark. 813 S.W.2d 123 (Mo. 1991) 41 
Nelson v. Truiillo. 657 P.2d at 730 (Utah 1982) 2 
Projects Unlimited v. Copper State Thrift. 798 P.2d 738 (Utah 1990) 22 
Scharfv.BMGCorp.. 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985) 1,2 
State v. Vigil. 815 P.2d 1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 3 
Terrv v. Panek. 631 P.2d 896 (Utah 1981) 25 
Utah State Road Commission v. Steele Ranch. 
533 P.2d 888 (Utah 1975) 26 
-iv-
Wellman v. Noble. 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961) 25 
Williams v. Singleton. 723 P.2d 421 (Utah 1996) 20 
STATUTES: 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 12,19,20 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 3,12,19, 20 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 etseq 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 23 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 23 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 44 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) 1 
RULES & REGULATIONS: 
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 2, 17,42, 43 
Rule 59(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 3,17,40 
Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 39 
Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 17 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 2, 3, 29, 42,43 
-v-
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Statement of Issue. Whether a valid contract for the sale of real estate exists when 
the contract has not been signed and accepted by the seller even though the contract specifically 
requires such acceptance. 
Standard of Review. Conclusions of law are accorded no particular deference, but 
are reviewed for correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
2. Statement of Issue. Whether an individual may tortiously interfere with a contract 
that does not exist as a matter of law. 
Standard of Review. Conclusions of law are accorded no particular deference, but 
are reviewed for correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
3. Statement of Issue. Whether acts by an individual, which allegedly took place 
after an offer to contract expired without being accepted, can be construed as having interfered 
with the contract. 
Standard of Review. Conclusions of law are accorded no particular deference, but 
are reviewed for correctness. Scharf v. BMGCorp.. 700 P.2d 1068,1070 (Utah 1985). 
4. Statement of Issue. Whether a mechanic's lien may be classified as wrongful 
because it was filed without making a demand for payment. 
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Standard of Review. Conclusions of law are accorded no particular deference, but 
are reviewed for correctness, Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
5. Statement of Issue. Whether a court may refuse to grant a partial new trial and 
consider the testimony of six individuals which establishes that the Court's ruling was obtained 
through perjury when the testimony of the individuals was timely offered pursuant to Rules 59 
and 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; particularly when the perjured testimony concerned a 
transaction which did not involve the appellant and the perjured testimony prevented the 
appellant from discovering facts essential to the case. 
Standard of Review. A trial court's grant or denial of a motion for a new trial will 
not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Christenson v. Jewkes. 761 P.2d 
1375, 1377 (Utah, 1988). If the lower court granted the motion for new trial, the appellate court 
will sustain that decision if the record contains "substantial competent evidence which would 
support a verdict for the [moving party]." Nelson v. Trujillo. 657 P.2d at 730, 732 (Utah 1982). 
6. Statement of Issue. Whether a court may accept the estimate of the fair market 
value of a home from a homeowner who does not know the square footage of his home and is 
unfamiliar with real estate transactions; when all other evidence indicates the home is worth 
substantially more than the amount estimated by the homeowner. 
Standard of Review. Conclusions of law are accorded no particular deference, but 
are reviewed for correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068. 1070 (Utah 1985). "Atrial 
court's findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, will not be set aside on 
appeal unless clearly erroneous." Gravson Roper Limited Partnership v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 
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467, 470 (Utah 1989). "A finding is clearly erroneous if it is against the great weight of evidence 
or if the court is otherwise definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made." 
Bountiful v. Riley. 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989). "A mixed question of law and fact is one 
in which the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed and the 
issue is whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. State v. 
Vigil 815 P.2d 1296, 1299 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted). 
7. Statement of Issue. Whether a judgment should be allowed to stand when the 
judgment is not supported by the evidence. 
Standard of Review. The appellate court will reverse if "viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the party who prevailed, [the court] conclude[s] that the evidence is 
insufficient to support the verdict." Hansen v. Stewart. 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW: 
Rule 59(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Utah Code Ann. §25-5-3. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 eLseg. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from the judgment entered by the lower court on July 29, 1996, wherein 
the court awarded damages in the amount of $193,000 to defendants based on plaintiffs alleged 
tortious interference with defendants' contract to sell their home, and upon the court's finding 
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that the plaintiff owed defendant $23,000 due to a breach of warranty and based upon the Court's 
ruling that the Contract between the parties was that the Appellant would build a home for 
Appellee for a fixed amount rather than on a cost-plus basis. (R. 408.) 
Appellant is also appealing the trial court's order denying appellant's request for the court 
to take additional testimony which establishes that Mr. Mattson knowingly testified falsely 
before the court and obtained a judgment based upon false testimony. In denying appellant's 
motion, the trial court held that Mr. Mattson's fraudulent testimony should have been discovered 
prior to or during trial. (R. 401.) 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition of the Case Below. 
This action stems from a breach of contract action filed by ProMax against the Mattsons 
wherein ProMax alleged that it built a home for the Mattsons on a cost-plus basis whereby the 
Mattsons would pay for the expense of the home and ProMax would be paid a $10,000 fee for 
overseeing the construction of the home. (R. 2.) On March 12 and 13, 1996, a trial on this 
matter was held before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick. (R.77.) 
On March 18, 1996, Judge Frederick issued a ruling from the bench awarding damages to 
the Mattsons in the amount of $193,000. The award of damages constituted $170,000 for 
tortious interference with the contract for the sale of the Mattsons' home and $23,000 for 
damages due to defective workmanship on the basis that such amount was owed because the 
contract to build the house was to be for a set fee. (R. 778.) 
On June 10, 1996, plaintiff filed a motion for partial new trial, requesting that the court 
take additional evidence which establishes that Matt Mattson offered perjured testimony during 
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trial, and that the Court's judgment was improper in other respects. (R. 157-159.) After the 
appropriate memoranda were filed by both parties, the court denied plaintiffs motion on the 
basis that such evidence was untimely. (R. 401.) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
Appellant ProMax entered into a contract with the Mattsons whereby ProMax agreed to 
act as general contractor relating to a residence to be constructed for the Mattsons at 6642 Stone 
Mill Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 2.) 
Under the terms of the contract, ProMax was to provide construction supervision 
services, obtain subcontractors and otherwise supervise the construction of the residence on the 
property and the Mattsons were to pay ProMax an amount equal to all of ProMax's actual costs 
payable to subcontractors together with a construction supervision fee in the amount of $10,000. 
(R. 2.) 
The Mattsons failed to pay subcontractors, materialmen and labor men in the amount of 
$9,475.42 which amounts ProMax was forced to pay. The Mattsons also failed to pay ProMax 
$5,058 of its construction management fee for a total amount due and owing to ProMax of 
$14,533.42. (R.2.) 
The Mattsons therefore breached their contract with ProMax by paying only a portion of 
the $10,000 builder's fee and by failing to pay $14,533.42 as required pursuant to the terms of 
the contract. (R. 2.) 
Upon completion of the home, the home was part of the Parade of Homes where it won 
the People's Choice Award. Wasatch Realty Group was involved in preparing the marketing for 
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the Mattson home during the Parade of Homes. At some time during the Parade of Homes, the 
employees of Wasatch Realty Group were informed that the home was being offered for sale at a 
price of $550,000, which included the furnishings of the home. (R. 166 and 189.) 
One afternoon, Phil Bates of ProMax asked Laurie Gale to hold the model open while he 
left to receive the "People's Choice" award for the Mattson home. While at the front door, a man 
named Curtis Johnsen asked Ms. Gale the price of the home. She informed Mr. Johnsen that the 
price of the home was $550,000. Mr. Johnsen stated that he was interested in buying the home. 
(R. 167 and 189.) 
Ms. Gale and Mr. Johnsen set up an appointment for later that afternoon to meet with 
Mr. Johnsen and his wife at Ms. Gale's office. At that time, Ms. Gale wrote up an offer on the 
home. After informing Mr. Mattson that Mr. Johnsen made an offer on the home, Mr. Mattson 
made a counteroffer of $565,000 because he claimed the furniture was more expensive than he 
had originally thought. A standard form purchase money agreement was then drawn up and 
signed by Mr. Johnsen on August 28, 1993. (R. 167 and 190.) 
Shortly after Mr. Johnsen signed the Earnest Money Agreement, a meeting was scheduled 
at the Mattson home to conduct a walk-through inspection of the home. (R. 169 and 190.) 
Upon arriving at the home, Ms. Gale began the walk-through with the Johnsens. Upon 
inspecting the basement of the home, Ms. Gale and the Johnsens saw Sherie Mattson doing some 
cleaning work and her children were wearing swimsuits and playing in the hot tub. (R. 169 and 
190.) 
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At that time, Ms. Mattson informed Ms. Gale and the Johnsens that the Mattsons had 
decided not to sell the home. Ms. Gale then spoke with Mr. Mattson over the telephone and he 
confirmed that the Mattsons had decided not to sell the home because they had attended church 
and made friends with the neighbors and that their children were already enrolled in the schools 
for that area and that they had become attached. (R. 169-170 and 190-191.) 
A material term of the Earnest Money Agreement was that the offer must be accepted 
in writing by August 30, 1993, as follows: 
AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. 
Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller 
shall have until 12:00 noon, August 30, 1993, to accept this offer. Unless 
accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the EARNEST 
MONEY to the Buyer. 
(R. 415 and 422-425. A copy of the Earnest Money Agreement is included in the addendum.) 
The Earnest Money Agreement contained a space which specifically provided for the 
sellers' signatures signifying acceptance of the offer. Mr. and Mrs. Mattson never signed the 
Earnest Money Agreement. The offer of the Johnsens therefore expired on August 30, 1993 
at 12:00 noon without being accepted by the Mattsons. The home was, therefore, not purchased 
by the Johnsens. (R. 415 and 424.) 
According to Mr. Johnsen, the reasons they decided not to buy the Mattson home were as 
follows: 
3. During the process of negotiating a purchase price for the home, 
Mrs. Mattson informed us that they no longer wanted to sell the home. 
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5. My wife and I did not purchase the home owned by the Mattsons 
due to two reasons: (1) they told us they no longer desired to sell the home; and 
(2) we were not able to come up with sufficient funds to buy the home. 
6. During the time that my wife and I were considering purchasing 
the home from the Mattsons, we were not made aware that any liens existed on 
the home and the existence of such liens in no way influenced our decision not to 
purchase the home. 
(R. 338-39.) 
On September 1 and 2, 1993, after Mr. Johnsen's offer had expired, six subcontractors 
filed liens on the Mattson home. (R. 649-650.) 
On or about August 3, 1994, ProMax filed a Complaint against the Mattsons for breach of 
contract and unjust enrichment in the amount of $14,533.42. (R. 1.) 
On October 11, 1994, the Mattsons filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim which 
contained eleven causes of action against ProMax, which included the following: (1) breach of 
contract; (2) breach of implied and express warranties; (3) misrepresentation; (4) fraudulent 
inducement; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (6) interference with contractual 
relations; (7) extortion; (8) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (9) slander; 
(10) conversion; and (11) slander of title. (R. 12-36.) 
Prior to trial, ProMax, through formal discovery, requested all documents which the 
Mattsons would use at trial. The Mattsons, however, did not provide the Earnest Money 
Agreement signed by Curtis Johnsen on August 28, 1993, which was ultimately relied upon by 
the trial court in awarding $170,000 for tortious interference with contractual relations. (R. 416, 
436-37 and 776.) 
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At trial, ProMax called Mark Barraclough, a former loan officer with Fair West Bank, as • 
its witness to testify regarding the loan relating to the Mattson home. (R. 471.) 
Mr. Barraclough testified that the terms of the contract between ProMax and the Mattsons 
were that the house would be built on a cost-plus basis. Although the loan was made for an 
established dollar amount, Mr. Barraclough testified the loan amount was merely a target figure 
which was to be supplemented by future additions. Mr. Barraclough also testified that cost-plus 
agreements are very common and that they are usually left open-ended and usually are not 
reduced to writing. (R. 197, 198, 476, 481, 484, 485.) 
Phil Bates and Culley Davis concurred with Mr. Barraclough's testimony that the 
agreement between ProMax and the Mattsons was that the home would be built on a cost-plus 
basis. (R. 562, 751, 764.) Conversely, Mr. Mattson testified that the agreement was that ProMax 
would build the home, which is over 7,000 square feet, for a set fee of approximately $156,200. 
(R. 637, 638.) 
With respect to the issue of the failed sale of the Mattson home, Mr. Mattson testified that 
after executing a valid and binding contract with Curtis Johnsen, Mr. Johnsen refused to purchase 
the Mattson home because certain materialmen had filed liens upon the home and such liens 
were allegedly filed at the direction of Mr. Bates. (R. 651.) 
Because ProMax was not a party to the agreement involving Curtis Johnsen and the 
Mattsons for the sale of the Mattson home, ProMax was unaware of the reason that the sale 
failed. (R. 423, 547.) ProMax accepted Mr. Mattson's testimony as true that the sale failed due 
to the filing of liens. ProMax's prior counsel did not obtain the testimony of Curtis Johnsen or 
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the real estate agents involved with the sale. At trial, ProMax offered Mr. Bates' testimony to 
refute Mr. Mattson's claim that the sale failed due to the filing of liens. ProMax also contended 
that Mr. Bates did not cause the sale of the Mattson home to fail and offered testimony in that 
regard. (R. 546-47.) 
During trial, Mr. Mattson testified that he incurred approximately $23,000 in expenses 
due to cost overruns and defective workmanship performed by ProMax. (R. 665.) This 
testimony was given in spite of the fact that he claimed only $15,000 in cost overruns in his 
deposition. (R. 91.) 
On March 18, 1996, the judge issued a ruling from the bench and awarded judgment 
against ProMax in the amount of $193,000. The judgment constituted $170,000 for Phil Bates' 
alleged interference with the sale of the Mattson home because Mr. Bates allegedly had six 
subcontractors file mechanic's liens prior to demanding payment. The Court also awarded 
$23,000 for expenses incurred due to defective workmanship. (R. 772-780.) 
Following the trial, ProMax retained new counsel. Upon review of the trial transcript, 
ProMax's new counsel identified several errors and inconsistencies in the court's ruling. 
ProMax's counsel also discovered that the sale of the Mattson home did not fail due to the 
actions of Phil Bates. Rather, the sale did not go through because the Mattsons told the 
prospective buyer that they did not want to sell the home because the prospective buyer did not 
have sufficient funds for the purchase of the home and because the Mattsons never accepted the 
buyer's offer. (R. 338-339.) 
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ProMax's counsel also discovered that the court misinterpreted Mr. Barraclough's 
testimony at trial and apparently granted judgment against ProMax based on its 
misunderstanding of Mr. Barraclough's testimony. ProMax's counsel further discovered that 
even if Mr. Bates did cause the sale to fail, (which he didn't) the damages awarded for the failed 
sale of the home were excessive. (R. 193-195.) 
On June 10, 1996, ProMax filed a Motion for Partial New Trial, which presented 
evidence that unequivocally showed that contrary to Mr. Mattson's testimony, the sale of the 
Mattson home did not fail due to the actions of Mr. Bates; rather, the sale failed because the 
Mattsons did not want to sell the home and the potential buyer did not have sufficient funds to 
purchase the home. (R. 157, 338-39.) 
In spite of the fact that ProMax submitted an affidavit of Mark Barraclough which 
clarified the court's misunderstanding of his testimony and reaffirmed that the home was to be 
built upon a cost-plus basis, and the affidavits of five individuals who were directly involved 
with the sale of the home, who all unequivocally stated that Phil Bates had nothing to do with the 
failed sale, and who all indicate that the Court's verdict was based upon perjured testimony by 
Mr. Mattson, the court refused to grant plaintiffs request for the court to take additional 
evidence which is appropriate pursuant to Rules 59 and 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(R.401.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. THE OFFER TO PURCHASE THE MATTSONS' HOME EXPIRED 
WITHOUT BEING ACCEPTED BY THE MATTSONS. 
The trial court's award of $170,000 due to the alleged tortious interference by Mr. Bates 
with the sale of the Mattson home is improper because Mr. Bates could not have interfered with a 
contract that, as a matter of law, never existed. The Earnest Money Agreement required that the 
prospective purchaser's offer by accepted in writing by August 30, 1993. This was never done. 
Therefore, there never was a valid contract for the sale of the Mattson's home. Thus, the court's 
finding that a valid and binding contract existed was erroneous. 
II. NO VALID CONTRACT EXISTED FOR THE SALE OF THE 
MATTSON HOME. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-5-1 and 25-5-3 require that contracts for the sale of real estate be 
in writing. The written acceptance required by the contract was never formally reduced to 
writing. Therefore, the Court's finding that a valid and binding contract was entered into was 
erroneous. 
The statute of frauds is a defense available to ProMax even though it was not asserted in 
its Reply to the Mattsons' counterclaim because the Mattsons never produced a writing pursuant 
to the discovery requests and ProMax was therefore unaware that the statute of frauds was at 
issue until ProMax was surprised by the Earnest Money Agreement at trial. 
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III. THE MECHANIC'S LIENS WERE FILED AFTER THE OFFER TO 
PURCHASE THE MATTSONS' HOME EXPIRED. 
Mr. Johnsen's offer to purchase the Mattson home expired on August 30, 1993, without 
being accepted by the Mattsons. On September 1, 1993 and September 2, 1993, liens were filed 
by subcontractors against the Mattson property. These liens were not a factor in the failed sale of 
the Mattson home as testified by Curtis Johnsen, the prospective buyer. Moreover, the offer had 
already expired at the time the liens were filed. Therefore, the liens had no effect on the failure 
of the sale. 
IV. THE COURT'S RULING THAT THE MECHANIC'S LIENS WERE 
WRONGFULLY FILED IS INCORRECT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The trial court specifically found that Mr. Bates had caused the mechanic's liens to be 
"wrongfully filed" because the liens were filed without the subcontractors first making demands 
for payment. However, the mechanic's lien statute in Utah does not require that a contractor or 
subcontractor make a demand for payment before filing a mechanic's lien. 
The mechanic's lien statute was enacted for the protection of contractors and 
subcontractors. Such liens are filed routinely and are not generally viewed as a significant cloud 
on the title of new homes. No evidence was presented that the liens were invalid or unwarranted. 
Therefore, the Court's ruling that the liens were wrongfully filed was incorrect as a matter of 
law. 
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V. EVEN IF THERE WERE A VALID CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF 
THE MATTSON HOME. PHIL BATES DID NOT CAUSE THE SALE 
TO FAIL. 
Curtis Johnsen, the individual who offered to purchase the Mattson home, submitted an 
affidavit stating that the reason the sale of the home failed was that the Mattsons did not want to 
sell the home and that the Johnsens were not able to come up with the money to purchase the 
home. The testimony of five other people familiar with the alleged sale supports Mr. Johnsen's 
testimony. Conversely, the only individual testifying that Phil Bates caused the sale of the home 
to fail was Mr. Mattson. The record is replete with examples of Mr. Mattson knowingly offering 
false testimony. Therefore the court's acceptance of Mr. Mattson's testimony over a mountain of 
evidence contradicting his testimony was erroneous. 
VI. EVEN IF MR. BATES WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FAILED 
SALE OF THE MATTSON HOME. THE $170.000 AWARD IS 
EXCESSIVE. 
The trial court allowed Mr. Mattson to offer his opinion regarding the market value of his 
home in spite of the fact that Mr. Mattson admitted he had no experience with real estate and did 
not even know the square footage of his home. If a person does not have a realistic idea of the 
value of the property, the owner's testimony has no probative use and should be deemed 
incompetent. 
The court determined that the value of the home was $390,000, and on that basis, 
awarded the Mattsons $170,000 for the failed sale of their home. However, the only evidence 
supporting the court's determination of $390,000 was Mr. Mattson's own self-serving testimony. 
-14-
The $390,000 value was essentially what the home cost, which is not an appropriate market 
value determination. 
ProMax submitted, and the evidence, including admissions from Mattsons and their 
counsel, substantiates that the home was worth substantially more than $390,000. Therefore, 
even if Phil Bates were the cause of the failed sale of the Mattson home, the court erred in 
awarding excessive damages. 
VII. THE CONTRACT BETWEEN PROMAX AND THE MATTSONS WAS 
THAT PROMAX WOULD BUILD THE MATTSONS' HOME FOR 
COST PLUS $10,000. 
The trial court misinterpreted or disregarded the testimony concerning the agreement to 
construct the Mattson home. Most notably are the court's misinterpretation of Mr. Barraclough's 
testimony and the court's misinterpretation of the construction cost breakdown. 
Mr. Barraclough testified that the home was to be built on a cost-plus basis. However, 
the court's decision focused on ambiguous statements by Mr. Barraclough, which were later 
clarified in Mr. Barraclough's Affidavit. Nonetheless, the court disregarded much of Mr. 
Barraclough's testimony that the home was to be built on a cost-plus basis and instead, 
determined that the home was to be built for a set fee in the amount of approximately $156,200 
for a home in excess of 7,000 square feet. 
The court also misinterpreted the construction cost breakdown list by ruling that the 
agreement for construction loan was to be for $190,200. The construction cost breakdown 
clearly shows that of the $190,200, $29,000 was toward the cost of the lot and $5,000 was for 
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loan costs. Thus, according to the court's interpretation of the testimony the contract was for no 
more than approximately $156,200. The court's ruling is not supported by the evidence or 
common logic. The court certainly would have been less likely to believe Mr. Mattson's 
testimony if the court had understood it was ruling that the agreement was to build the home for 
$156,000 instead of $190,000. 
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
The March 18 ruling by the court, coupled with the Findings of Fact and the Judgment, 
clearly contradict the evidence submitted at the trial. The court's ruling contradicts the record, 
including, but not limited to, the following items and issues: 
1. the court misinterpreted the cost breakdown for the Mattson home; 
2. the Mattsons did not ask for a written contract; 
3. the court misinterpreted Mr. Barraclough's testimony; 
4. the value of the home at completion was far in excess of $390,000; 
5. change orders do not need to be written; 
6. the court's ruling regarding the failed sale of the Mattson home was 
clearly erroneous; 
7. the Mattsons never accepted the Johnsens' offer to purchase their home; 
8. making a demand for payment is not a pre-requisite to filing a mechanic's 
lien; 
9. the sale of the Mattson home did not fail because of the mechanic's liens; 
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10. the court miscalculated the cost overruns; 
11. the court misconstrued Culley Davis' testimony; and 
12. the court improperly held that the parties stipulated that cost overruns 
existed. 
IX. RULE 59fa\ UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. ALLOWS THE 
TRIAL COURT TO TAKE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE. 
The court denied ProMax's motion for partial new trial to take additional evidence on the 
basis that the evidence presented in conjunction with ProMax's motion and memorandum should 
have purportedly been discovered at trial. However, Rules 59 and 60, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, clearly provide that a partial new trial under the circumstances in this case was 
appropriate. 
This case involved perjured testimony, substantial evidence that the court's judgment was 
incorrect, that ProMax was surprised at trial by the earnest money agreement, which it had never 
previously been provided, that newly discovered evidence existed, that excessive damage 
existed, that the evidence was insufficient and that the court made errors of law. 
ProMax's motion for a partial new trial was appropriate under both Rule 59 and 60. 
Moreover, the evidence and the proffered testimony in this case were sufficient to compel the 
court to grant ProMax's motion. 
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ARGUMENT 
L THE OFFER TO PURCHASE THE MATTSONS' HOME EXPIRED 
WITHOUT BEING ACCEPTED BY THE MATTSONS. 
The trial court awarded damages due to Phil Bates' alleged tortious interference with the 
sale of the Mattson home. Based on the Earnest Money Agreement (Exhibit 54) and the 
testimony of Matt Mattson that the Mattsons had a contract with Curtis Johnsen to sell their 
home, and upon Mr. Mattson's testimony that Phil Bates allegedly tortiously interfered with the 
sale of the Mattson home, the trial court awarded damages to defendants in the amount of 
$170,000 due to Mr. Bates' alleged tortious interference with the sale of the Mattson home. 
However, there was no valid contract for the sale of the Mattson home because the written offer 
to purchase the Mattson home expired without being accepted. (See Exhibit 54, included in the 
addendum.) The Mattsons' claim for interference with the contract for the sale of the home 
should have failed as a matter of basic contract law at the trial level. 
Phil Bates could not have interfered with a contract that, as a matter of law, never existed. 
The offer, as contained in the Earnest Money Agreement, expired pursuant to its own terms on 
August 30, 1993, as follows: 
Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller 
shall have until 12:00 noon, Aug. 30, 1993, to accept this offer. Unless accepted, 
this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the Earnest Money to the Buyer. 
The Earnest Money Agreement contains the signature of Curtis Johnsen, but lacks the 
required signatures of Matt and Sherie Mattson. (See Exhibit 54, addendum.) . 
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In its March 18 ruling, the Court found that "[o]n August 28th, 1993 . . . Defendants 
accepted the offer." (R. 776.) There was no testimony or evidence presented at trial which 
substantiates the Court's finding that the offer was accepted on August 28, 1993. Conversely, 
the Earnest Money Agreement clearly illustrates that the offer was never accepted. 
To be formally accepted, the offer contained in the Earnest Money Agreement needed to 
be signed by the Mattsons before noon August 30, 1993, which was never done. Thus, the offer 
of Mr. Johnsen expired at noon on August 30, 1993. Phil Bates and ProMax, therefore, could not 
be legally responsible for the failed sale because there was never a binding contract for the sale 
of the home. 
II. NO VALID CONTRACT EXISTED FOR THE SALE OF THE 
MATTSON HOME. 
Not only does the trial court's award for tortious interference with contractual relations 
fail due to the absence of a contract, but also the Earnest Money Agreement fails to comply with 
the statute of frauds. To have a valid contract for the sale of real property, the sale must be 
reduced to writing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-5-1 and 25-5-3, which read as follows: 
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not exceeding 
one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or in any manner 
relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared 
otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing 
subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the 
same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
Utah Code Ann. §25-5-1. 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of 
any lands, or anv interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note 
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or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the lease 
or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (emphasis added). 
Sections 25-5-1 and 25-5-3 mandate "expressly that a document to be enforceable under 
the statute of frauds must be subscribed by the party granting the conveyance." Williams v. 
Singleton. 723 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1996). 
In rendering the judgment, the Court relied upon Exhibit 54, a standard earnest money 
agreement. However, Exhibit 54 was not signed by either of the Mattsons.1 Accordingly, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3, there was no writing to validate a contract for the sale of 
the Mattson home. 
Additionally, Mr. Mattson's own testimony indicates that the Earnest Money Agreement 
does not signify the final terms of sale discussed by the parties. Mr. Mattson testified that after 
the offer of $565,000 was presented, a counter-offer of $550,000 was presented and agreed upon. 
(R. 698-99.) The Earnest Money Agreement makes no mention of the $550,000 counteroffer. 
The Court's award of damages was therefore, not only improper under the Earnest Money 
Agreement, but also was not even based upon the agreement that Mr. Mattson described. Thus, 
pursuant to the statute of frauds, the Mattsons' claim fails as a matter of law. 
The Mattsons may argue that ProMax is barred from asserting the statute of frauds 
because it failed to plead the statute of frauds as an affirmative defense in its reply to the 
Mattsons' counterclaim. However, the statute of frauds was not set forth in the reply to the 
*Mr. Mattson testified at trial that he signed the Earnest Money Agreement. However, 
this statement is false. Mr. Mattson did not sign the Earnest Money Agreement. (R. 91 at 96.) 
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Mattsons' counterclaim because ProMax was unaware that a written agreement existed or, that if 
a written agreement did exist, that it was defective. Through formal written discovery, ProMax 
should have discovered that a written agreement existed and that the statute of frauds was a 
defense. However, in spite of the fact that ProMax requested such documents pursuant to formal 
discovery requests, the Mattsons never provided such documents. (R. 416, 436-37.) 
Pursuant to a document request filed on January 6, 1995, plaintiff requested all 
documents to be used as exhibits in this trial. (R. 416, 436-37.) In spite of being duty-bound to 
deliver the Earnest Money Agreement pursuant to the discovery requests, defendants failed to do 
so. At trial, when defendants' counsel attempted to introduce Exhibit 54 as an exhibit, plaintiffs 
counsel objected on the basis that such a document had been requested, but had not been 
produced. (R. 559-560.) The Mattsons can point to no evidence which indicates that they 
produced the Earnest Money Agreement. 
The Mattsons should, therefore, be allowed to assert the statute of frauds as a defense 
because the Mattsons' actions prevented ProMax from examining the Earnest Money Agreement 
and therefore from being able to appropriately assert the statute of frauds. 
III. THE MECHANIC'S LIENS WERE FILED AFTER THE OFFER TO 
PURCHASE THE MATTSONS' HOME EXPIRED. 
Mr. Johnsen's offer to purchase the Mattson home expired on August 30, 1993, without 
being accepted by the Mattsons. Mr. Mattson testified that Mr. Bates called Mr. Mattson on 
August 31. 1993. and inquired whether Mr. Mattson was going to "cut [Mr. Bates] out of the 
deal" by not using Mr. Bates as his selling broker. (R. 647-48.) Upon being informed by Mr. 
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Mattson that Mr. Bates was not going to be used as a broker, Mr. Mattson testified that Mr. Bates 
stated that he would kill Mr. Mattson's deal. (R. 649.) 
Thereafter, on September 1, 1993 and September 2, 1993, six liens were filed by 
subcontractors. (R. 650.)2 Based upon this information, the trial court awarded damages to the 
Mattsons in the amount of $170,000 for tortious interference by Mr. Bates with respect to the 
sale of the Mattson home. (R. 779.) The trial court's award of damages, however, was 
erroneous. 
Not only did Mr. Johnsen, the prospective purchaser, testify in his affidavit that the liens 
were not the cause of the failed sale, but even if the mechanic's liens were filed at the direction 
of Mr. Bates, Mr. Bates could not be held legally responsible for interfering with a contract that, 
as a matter of law, did not exist because the offer to purchase expired without being accepted. 
IV. THE MECHANIC'S LIENS WERE VALID AND PROPER. 
The purpose of the mechanic's lien statute is "remedial in nature and seeks to provide 
protection to laborers and materialmen who have added directly to the value of the property of 
another by their materials or labor." Projects Unlimited v. Copper State Thrift, 798 P.2d 738, 
743 (Utah 1990). The mechanic's lien statute is to be liberally construed, and the "modern trend 
is to dispense with arbitrary rules which have no demonstrable value in a particular fact 
situation." Id, at 744 (quoting Consolidated Electric Distributors. Inc. v. Jepson Electric 
2Although Mr. Mattson testified that the liens were filed on September 1, and 2, the liens 
were actually filed on September 2, and 3, 1993. (Exhibits 44-48 are included in the 
Addendum.) 
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Contracting. Inc.. 537 P.2d 80, 83 (Or. 1975)). As such, minor technical insufficiencies will not 
defeat the mechanic's lien unless they have "compromised a purpose of the mechanic's lien 
statute." Id 
The trial court specifically found that Mr. Bates caused the mechanic's liens against the 
property to be "wrongfully filed" because the subcontractors did not first make demand for 
payment. (R. 406, 776, 779.) This finding, however, is erroneous because the Utah Mechanic's 
Lien Statute imposes no requirement to demand payment before filing a lien. The Utah 
Mechanics' Lien statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing 
or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration, or 
improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in any 
manner . . . shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which they 
have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or 
equipment for the value of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or 
equipment furnished.. . . 
Utah Code Ann., §38-1-3. Thus, a mechanic's lien automatically arises in favor of one who 
performs labor or provides materials upon real property, as long as the claimant complies with 
the statute. Section 38-1-7 then requires the lien claimant to record a written notice to hold and 
claim a lien within 90 days from the date labor was last performed or materials furnished on the 
project. The statute does not require anywhere that a claimant must first make demand for 
payment in order to be entitled to and assert a mechanic's lien. No Utah cases have interpreted 
the statute to include such a requirement. The claimant must only comply with the plain 
language of the statute. See First Security Mortgage Company v. Hansen. 631 P.2d 919, 922 
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(Utah 1981). Accordingly, the trial court's finding that the lien was "wrongfully filed" was 
incorrect. 
V. EVEN IF THERE WERE A VALID CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF 
THE MATTSON HOME. PHIL BATES DID NOT CAUSE THE SALE 
TO FAIL. 
Mr. Mattson testified that the Johnsens did not purchase the home because liens were 
filed on the home. (R. 649-52, 779, 91 at 97-98 and 109.) However, along with Phil Bates, five 
additional people, including the potential buyers (Curtis Johnsen, Nancy Johnsen, Laurie Gale, 
Marty Gale and Greg Fabiano), all with nothing at stake in this litigation and all familiar with the 
transaction involving the sale of the Mattson home, unequivocally state that Phil Bates had 
nothing to do with the failed sale of the Mattson home. (R. 151, 171, 181, 338-39, 340-41.) 
Curtis Johnsen, the potential buyer, states as follows: 
3. During the process of negotiating a purchase price for the home, 
Mrs. Mattson informed us that they no longer wanted to sell the home. 
5. My wife and I did not purchase the home owned by the Mattsons 
due to two reasons: (1) they told us they no longer desired to sell the home; and 
(2) we were not able to come up with sufficient funds to buy the home. 
6. During the time that my wife and I were considering purchasing 
the home from the Mattsons, we were not made aware that any liens existed on 
the home and the existence of such liens in no way influenced our decision not to 
purchase the home. 
(R. 338-39.) 
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The only witness supporting defendants' connection regarding the failed sale is 
Mr. Mattson, whose testimony appears to be perjured. At best, Mr. Mattson might argue that he 
was mistaken. But relief from a judgment based upon mistake is also appropriate. Gillmor v. 
Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 435-36 (Utah 1993). 
Because $170,000 was awarded on what six people claim is perjured testimony, it was 
not unreasonable to ask the trial court to reexamine the evidence and change its ruling. See 
Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961); overruled on other grounds (when 
there is substantial evidence showing a reasonable basis to support a verdict in favor of the party 
moving for a new trial, there is no abuse of discretion in granting a new trial); In re Cook. 527 
A.2d 1115, 1116 (Pa. 1987) ("when the Court determines that perjury has been committed, it is 
within the Court's discretion to grant a new trial"). The trial court should have ruled on the 
merits of the additional evidence presented by plaintiff instead of denying plaintiffs motion for 
the court to take additional evidence. 
VI. EVEN IF MR. BATES WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FAILED 
SALE OF THE MATTSON HOME, THE $170.000 AWARD IS 
EXCESSIVE. 
As a general rule, "[A] knowledgeable owner is competent to give evidence on the 
market value of his real property." See Terry v. Panek. 631 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1981) 
(emphasis added). In this case, however, Mr. Mattson's testimony indicates that he was not 
qualified to give an opinion regarding the market value of his home. If a person does not have a 
realistic idea of the value of the property, the owner's testimony has no probative use and should 
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be deemed incompetent. Utah State Road Commission v. Steele Ranch. 533 P.2d 888, 891 (Utah 
1975). 
During the trial, Mr. Mattson admitted that he had no previous experience with bidding or 
building a home. (R. 635.) Mr. Mattson also admitted that he didn't even know the square 
footage of his home, by stating as follows: 
Q: Would you agree with me that your home is approximately 7,113 square 
feet? 
A: I really don't know to be quite honest with you. 
(R. 702, 687.) An owner cannot give a realistic opinion of market value if he doesn't even know 
the size of the home. "[M]ere ownership does not render a person competent to render an 
opinion as to value, unless he is in fact familiar with facts which give the property value." Utah 
State Road Commission v. Johnson. 550 P.2d 216, 220 (Utah 1976). 
When asked his opinion regarding the value of his home, Mr. Mattson answered, 
"[p]robably 390, 395." (R. 678-79.) Mr. Mattson's estimate of the market value of his home is 
essentially what the home cost. However, "[wr]hat the property is worth to a seller is not a 
correct basis for the opinion." Utah State Road Commission v. Johnson. 550 P.2d 216, 217 
(Utah 1976). Mr. Mattson's offering the cost of the home as estimated market value does not 
even consider the savings of 10-12% profit that a contractor normally receives on such a job as 
testified by Culley Davis. (R. 751.) Using the cost of the home as the estimated market value is 
improper and even if it were a proper method of valuation, the value would surely have to 
include cost savings, which Mr. Mattson's estimate failed to consider. 
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By citing the price of the home as the market value of the home, Mr. Mattson failed to 
take into account the numerous discounts he received on the home, which by his own testimony 
reduced the cost of the home by 40%. (R. 661.) Such discounts include, but are not limited to, 
the following: (1) $10,000 worth of free countertops (R. 542); (2) a free fire alarm equaling a 
$4,500 savings (R. 565); (3) discounts on roofing materials (R. 568); (4) free plumbing (R. 570); 
(5) substantial discounts on soffit and fascia (R. 572); (6) discounts on carpet (R. 572-73); (7) 
discounts on brick (R. 573); (8) possible discounts on the pool (R. 687-88); and (9) 50% savings 
on a sauna (R. 750). The Mattsons' own attorney admits "there were some things [the Mattsons] 
got for free." (R. 570-71.) 
By offering the approximate cost of the home as the estimated market value, Mr. Mattson 
also failed to inform the Court that in early 1994 the house was appraised at approximately 
$450,000. (R. 91 at 80-81 and 135.) Another appraisal was obtained establishing the 1993 value 
of the home at approximately $465,000. (R. 247.) 
The Mattsons' attorney also makes several assertions that the market value of the home is 
between $450,000 and $560,000. (R. 581 and 586.) In spite of this substantial evidence that 
indicates the home was worth substantially more than $390,000, including a written offer for 
$565,000, the trial court disregarded the evidence and instead relied on Mr. Mattson's self-
serving statement that the home was worth $390,000 when finished. 
The transaction involving Curtis Johnsen also appears to have included the furnishings 
that were in the home during the Parade of Homes. (R. 150 and 181.) Therefore, a portion of the 
purchase price would have been for the furnishings. Accordingly, the value of the furnishings 
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should have been established in order to determine the price to be paid for the house and the 
price to be paid for the furnishings. This is particularly relevant in light of the fact that Mr. 
Mattson owns a furniture store and most likely would have had top quality furniture in the home 
for purposes of advertisement. In fact, Mr. Mattson stated that one leather sofa in the home was 
worth over $20,000. (R. 166.) 
Moreover, if the Earnest Money Agreement were valid, which it is not due to the statute 
of frauds, the Earnest Money Agreement provides that three percent of the purchase price, or 
$16,950, was to be paid in commission to Laurie Gale. (See Exhibit 54 in addendum.) The 
$16,950 commission due to Laurie Gale is money that the Mattsons would have never received if 
the home had been sold to the Johnsens and the $16,950 should not have been awarded to the 
Mattsons. In sum, even if the Mattsons were entitled to damages relating to the failed sale of 
their home, the Mattsons should not have been awarded the difference between $390,000 and 
$560,000. 
VII. THE CONTRACT BETWEEN PROMAX AND THE MATTSONS WAS 
THAT PROMAX WOULD BUILD THE MATTSONS' HOME FOR 
COST PLUS $10.000. 
At trial, the parties disputed the type of contract that existed for building the Mattson 
home. ProMax contended that the terms of the contract were that the Mattsons would pay for 
expenses plus pay ProMax a $10,000 fee. Conversely, Mr. Mattson contended that ProMax was 
to build the home, in excess of 7,000 square feet, for approximately $156,200. 
The trial court ruled in favor of the Mattsons on this issue. In reviewing the record, it is 
clear that the basis for the Court's decision is derived from the Court's misunderstanding the 
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testimony of ProMax's first and most important witness, Mark Barraclough, the loan officer who 
handled the construction loan with Matt Mattson. The Court ruled that the contract between 
Matt Mattson and ProMax was a fixed amount and not a cost-plus contract. 
Upon reviewing the trial transcript, plaintiffs new counsel noticed that the questions 
presented to Mr. Barraclough and his resulting answers were ambiguous. It was also apparent 
that the trial court misunderstood or chose to ignore the salient portion of Mr. Barraclough's 
testimony. ProMax's counsel then contacted Mr. Barraclough, at which time Mr. Barraclough 
clarified his testimony which was subsequently submitted to the Court in the form of an affidavit 
in connection with ProMax's 60(b) motion to vacate the judgment. In the trial court's March 18, 
1996 ruling from the bench, the judge stated: 
Mark Barraclough, the former loan officer of Fair West Bank who handled the 
construction loan, stated in his deposition that "we went in for a certain dollar figure to 
accommodate the builder and the borrower." He further testified that in his 18 years as a 
construction loan officer, cost-plus contracts were extremely rare and he had only seen 
approximately six of them, and moreover, that he would not have authorized an arbitrary price 
for construction. 
(R. 775.) This does not comport with Mr. Barraclough's testimony. As clarified in his 
subsequent affidavit, Mr. Barraclough did make reference to a "certain dollar amount"; however, 
he was referring to the loan amount. The loan amount was to be a certain amount. It is 
understood that custom home contracts have undefined variables that are frequently changed. 
With respect to the Mattson loan, Mr. Barraclough testified at trial and continues to maintain 
"that the home was to be built on a cost-plus [basis].. ." (R. 161, 476.) 
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Mr. Barraclough's affidavit also clarified the Court's confusion regarding 
Mr. Barraclough's testimony contained in the Trial Transcript. The Court stated that in Mr. 
Barraclough's "18 years as a construction loan officer, cost-plus contracts were extremely rare 
and he had only seen approximately six of them . . . " (R. 775.) This is not true. Cost-plus 
agreements are very common. In fact, on average, Mr. Barraclough sees approximately one or 
two cost-plus contracts a week in his current job as a loan officer for Republic Mortgage. When 
he worked at Far West Bank, Mr. Barraclough worked almost exclusively with cost-plus 
contracts which were usually open-ended and not written. (R. 161-62.) 
Mr. Barraclough clarified his testimony to alleviate the Court's confusion. The relevant 
colloquy clarified by Mr. Barraclough from the trial transcript is as follows: 
Q: And careful builders are clear typically to say that it is a cost-plus when 
it's a cost-plus, and that is typically in the papers, correct? 
A: I disagree. With the people that I work with, that is not a normal way of 
doing business. 
Q: It's your experience that they're left open? 
A: Pretty much. 
Q: and those open-ended contracts don't say cost-plus? 
A: I assume probably in my 18 years of cost-plus contracts, maybe a half a 
dozen at most. 
Q: Haifa dozen? That's it? 
A: Yeah. 





Mr. Barraclough testified that cost-plus agreements are typically left open. He testified 
that in his 18 years of cost-plus contracts, only approximately half a dozen of the open-ended 
cost-plus contracts were actually written and actually said cost-plus. Mr. Barraclough's affidavit 
establishes that he wasn't saying that he had only dealt with a half dozen cost-plus contracts. 
Furthermore, Mr. Barraclough did not testify that he would not have authorized an 
arbitrary price for construction as the Court stated by the Court in its March 18 ruling. At trial, 
Mr. Barraclough stated that he would authorize a price knowing there was going to be over-runs 
if "we knew certain variables." (R. 163.) Such variables were known in this case and such a 
transaction was authorized by Mr. Barraclough. (R. 163.) 
Another misunderstanding of the trial court is evidenced by the Court's statement that 
"notwithstanding the financing documents with the bank specifying the price of $190,200 for the 
construction itself." (R. 74.) The cost of construction itself was not $190,000. The construction 
cost breakdown for the Mattson home (Exhibit 21) clearly shows that $29,000 of the $190,200 
was to be for one-half of the lot. (A copy of Exhibit 21 is included in the addendum.) Another 
$5,000 was for the construction loan costs. The Court's holding that the price for construction 
only was $190,200 is therefore incorrect. Under the Court's interpretation, the cost for 
construction only would have been a mere $156,000. The Court certainly would have been less 
likely to believe Mr. Mattson's testimony if the Court had realized Mr. Mattson was claiming the 
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home was to be built for approximately $156,000, which the Court obviously did not compre-
hend. Clearly, the Court did not fully comprehend the evidence regarding the value of the home. 
It is also a clear error to suppose that a contractor would build an award-winning house in 
excess of 7,000 square feet for the price of $156,200, which is actually what the court's 
interpretation of the construction cost breakdown would indicate. From this evidence and the 
evidence offered at trial, including Mr. Mattson's testimony regarding the numerous unsettled 
variables and subsequent additions, it is obvious that the construction cost breakdown was to be 
used merely as a starting point, with subsequent additions to take place. 
In connection with ProMax's Motion for Partial New Trial, the trial court was presented 
with affidavits of several other individuals which supported ProMax's contention that the 
Contract between ProMax and the Mattsons was cost plus a $10,000 fee. (R. 330-353.) The 
Affidavit of Randell Silcox establishes that cost-plus agreements are common in the construction 
industry. Mr. Silcox's affidavit states that a large portion of the loans for custom-built homes 
that he has been involved with relied on contracts which were cost-plus. (R. 178.) Mr. Silcox 
also states that "contracts usually involve a set amount for purposes of the loan, with the 
understanding that the parties will make changes to that amount according to their preferences 
regarding material, additions, etc." (R. 178.) 
Mr. Silcox, in fact, assisted Rick Raile and Phil Bates of ProMax in executing a loan that 
involved a cost-plus agreement. (R. 178.) This contradicts the testimony offered in favor of the 
Mattsons by the Railes at the trial. 
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As additional evidence that the Contract was to be cost-plus, the trial court was provided 
with the affidavits of Paul Shaw, Mark Eldredge, and Len Pickens, three reputable builders. (R. 
346-47, 372-75.) In fact, all three have served on the board of the Utah Home Builders 
Association, with Mr. Shaw as past president and Mr. Pickens as current president. All three of 
these men testify that cost-plus agreements are very common in the construction industry. The 
trial court was also provided with the affidavits of nine individuals, all of whom had recently 
purchased a home from ProMax on a cost-plus basis. (R. 330-353.) 
Another error by the trial court involves the Court's determination that the parties had 
stipulated that there were $140,000 of cost overruns. (R. 703-705.) However, ProMax agreed to 
no such stipulation. (R. 662, 703-705.) The Court's ruling that there was such a stipulation 
clearly influenced the Court's decision. 
In sum, the trial court took Mr. Mattson's word over Mr. Bates' word and Mr. 
Barraclough's testimony and determined the contract was to be for a set fee. In light of the fact 
that ample evidence has been presented to establish that Mr. Mattson knowingly offered false 
testimony concerning the failed sale of his home, offered incompetent testimony regarding the 
value of his home, and falsely testified concerning the contract to have ProMax build the home, 
this Court should reverse the trial court's decision and award ProMax the amount due under the 
cost-plus agreement, plus attorneys' fees. Alternatively, this case should be remanded for the 
purpose of taking additional evidence. 
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VIII. THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
In its March 18, 1996 ruling, the Court set forth Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. These findings and conclusions are full of errors and inconsistencies which contradict the 
testimony offered at trial. An examination of the Court's March 18 ruling, contrasted with the 
trial testimony and evidence, clearly establishes that the Judge's ruling does not comport with the 
evidence. 
A. The Court Misinterpreted the Cost Breakdown (Exhibit 21) for the 
Mattson Home. 
In its ruling, the Court stated that "notwithstanding the financing documents with the 
bank specifying the price of $190,200 for the construction itself." (R. 774.) The cost of 
construction itself was not $190,000. The construction cost breakdown for the Mattson home 
(Exhibit 21 at trial) clearly shows that $29,000 of the $190,200 was to be for one-half of the lot. 
Another $5,000 was for the construction loan costs. The Court's holding that the price for 
construction only was $190,200 is therefore clearly an error. The Court certainly would have 
been less likely to believe Mr. Mattson's testimony if the Court had realized Mr. Mattson was 
claiming the home was to be built for approximately $156,000, which the Court clearly did not 
comprehend. 
B. The Mattsons Did Not Ask for a Written Contract. 
The Court also found "[t]hat all times Defendants sought but were refused by Bates a 
written contract specifying the terms of the agreement, namely, whether it was a cost-plus or 
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specified fixed cost contract." (R. 774-75.) At no time during the trial was any testimony 
offered that the Mattsons requested a written contract. 
Mr. Mattson's own testimony affirms that he never sought any written documentation 
establishing his agreement with ProMax, as follows: 
Q: Did you ever seek any written documentation? 
A: This was good enough. I thought this was. 
THE COURT: No. The question is did you seek any? 
THE WITNESS: Oh, I'm sorry. No, I did not, other than this [referring to 
the cost breakdown], no. 
(R. 690.) 
C. The Court Misinterpreted Mr. Barraclough's Testimony. 
With respect to Mr. Barraclough, the only third party involved in the transaction between 
the Mattsons and ProMax, the court stated that Mr. Barraclough testified that: 
In his 18 years as a construction loan officer, cost-plus contracts were extremely 
rare and he had only seen approximately six of them, and moreover, that he would 
not have authorized an arbitrated price for construction. 
(R. 775.) 
The trial court's assessment of Mr. Barraclough's testimony is not only inaccurate, but 
the trial court failed to give any credence to Mr. Barraclough's statement that: "What I do 
remember is that the home was to be built on a cost-plus . . . " 
(R. 476.) 
Mr. Barraclough also testified that: 
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We all knew from day one that there would probably be extras and that we had to 
established, because of deadlines, a price, and if in fact those things would go 
over, then it certainly would be the responsibility . . . of the individual... to cover 
i t 
(R. 476-77.) 
D. The Value of the Home at Completion Was Far in Excess of 
$390,000. 
As discussed above, the only testimony or evidence offered supporting a value of 
$390,000 was the testimony of Matt Mattson, who admitted he no experience in real estate and 
did not even know the square footage of the home. When viewed in contrast to the mountain of 
evidence that shows the home was worth drastically more than $390,000, the trial court's 
determination that the value was $390,000 is clearly erroneous. 
E. Change Orders Do Not Need To Be Written. 
The court stated that a factor was its decision was that "not one written change order was 
obtained or produced at the trial." (R. 775.) There is no legal requirement that change orders be 
written. Moreover, Mr. Mattson's own testimony is replete with examples of subsequent 
changes. Furthermore, it was Mr. Mattson's understanding that many of the building materials to 
be used in the home were to be decided at a later date, which would necessitate change orders. 
(R. 694-96.) 
F. The Court's Ruling Regarding the Failed Sale of the Mattson 
Home Was Clearly Erroneous. 
The court stated that "Defendants were able to obtain an offer from a ready, willing, and 
able buyer to purchase the home for $560,000." (R. 776.) This does not comport with the 
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evidence. Exhibit 54, the Earnest Money Agreement, illustrates that the offer, which was never 
accepted, was for $565,000. Moreover, Matt Mattson testified that the $565,000 offer was later 
changed to $550,000. (R. 698-99.) No evidence was presented regarding the alleged $550,000 
contract and the Court made no mention of it in the Court's findings. 
G. The Mattsons Never Accepted the Johnsens' Offer to Purchase 
Their Home. 
In its March 18 ruling, the Court found that "[o]n August 28th, 1993 . . . Defendants 
accepted the offer." (R. 776.) There was no testimony or evidence presented at trial which 
substantiates the Court's finding that the offer was accepted on August 28, 1993. Conversely, 
the Earnest Money Agreement clearly illustrates that the offer was never accepted. 
H. Making a Demand for Payment Is Not a Pre-requisite to Filing a 
Mechanic's Lien. 
The court found that mechanic's liens were wrongfully filed against the Mattsons' home 
because no demand for payment was made before filing the liens. However, Utah Ann. §38-1-1 
et seq. contains no requirement that demand for payment be made before filing such liens. Thus, 
the court's finding that Bates had materialmen wrongfully file liens because "he had suppliers 
and/or materialmen file liens even though he knew no demands for payment had been made on 
Defendant," was in error because there is no requirement that a materialman make a demand for 
payment before filing a materialman's lien. (R. 776.) 
Even if Phil Bates did have his subcontractors file liens, it is not improper for a contractor 
to look after his subcontractors' best interests by advising them to file liens. Therefore, the 
court's determination that filing the liens was wrongful was in error. 
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L The Sale of the Mattson Home Did Not Fail Because of the 
Mechanic's Liens. 
The court found that "[t]he potential buyer, when apprised of the liens, backed out of the 
transaction." (R. 776.) As established in the affidavits of Curtis Johnsen, Nancy Johnsen, Marty 
Gale, Laurie Gale, and Greg Fabiano, the sale did not fail due to mechanic's liens. The sale, in 
fact, failed because the Mattsons informed the Johnsens that they no longer desired to sell the 
home. 
J. The Court Miscalculated the Cost Overruns. 
In its March 18 ruling, the court stated that "Defendants paid approximately $170,000 
more than called for . . . " (R. 778.) However, the testimony of Mr. Mattson was that the 
overruns were $140,000. (R. 706.) Appellant noted the discrepancy to the court, which amended 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to reflect that the alleged overruns were only 
$140,000. Nevertheless, the Court's initial finding of $170,000 is futher evidence of the Court's 
lack of understanding in this case. 
K. The Court Misconstrued Culley Davis' Testimony. 
The Court found that "[t]he owner of the Plaintiffs corporation acknowledged in his 
deposition that he was unaware that the basic price was about $195,000, while at trial he insisted 
that the contract was cost-plus." (R. 778.) This misconstrues Mr. Davis' testimony. 
Mr. Davis did testify in his deposition that they would build the Mattsons' "home, plus 
$10,000 or $12,000" (R. 92 at 22.) Mr. Davis attempted to clarify his statements regarding the 
so-called basic price during his deposition, but was refused the opportunity by opposing counsel. 
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(R. 92 at 41-42.) Mr. Davis did, however, clarify this statement to the Court at trial. (R. 751, 
753, 756-57.) In spite of all of Mr. Davis' clarification, the Court focused on an ambiguous 
statement, which was later clarified during the deposition and at trial, and still held that Mr. 
Davis' testimony was "too inconsistent and contradictory to be persuasive." The Court's holding 
was improper. 
L. The Court Improperly Ruled That The Parties Stipulated That 
There Were Cost Overruns. 
The Court improperly ruled that the parties stipulated that $140,000 in cost overruns 
existed (R. 703-05.) ProMax never agreed to any such stipulation. (R. 703-05.) 
IX. RULE 59faV UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. ALLOWS THE 
TRIAL COURT TO TAKE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE. 
The trial court denied ProMax's Motion for Partial New Trial on the basis that ProMax's 
motion was allegedly untimely. However, a motion for new trial, partial new trial, etc. is proper 
until "10 days after the entry of the judgment." (Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.) 
ProMax's Motion for Partial New Trial was well within this time frame. 
The trial court ruled that ProMax's Motion for Partial New Trial was properly dismissed 
because all relevant evidence should have allegedly been submitted at trial. It is debatable, 
however, whether Mr. Mattson's false testimony could have or should have been discovered by 
plaintiff. The Court felt that ProMax should have discovered Mr. Mattson was lying prior to or 
during trial. However, ProMax was not involved with the transaction regarding the failed sale of 
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the home and although ProMax requested documents such as the Earnest Money Agreement, it 
was never presented with the document until being surprised with it during trial. 
Furthermore, Rule 59(a) provides several grounds for partial new trial that do not involve 
new evidence. This Court should reverse the trial court's judgment or require the trial court to 
take additional evidence as requested by ProMax in accordance with Rule 59, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure which provides: 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to 
all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following 
causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried 
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take 
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new 
findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse 
party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which 
either party was prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the 
jurors have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, 
or to a finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by 
resort to a determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such 
misconduct may be proved by the affidavit or any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not 
have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making 
the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, 
have discovered and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other 
decision or that it is against law. 
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(7) Error in law. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Subsection (1) provides that a new trial may be granted "[i]f irregularity in the 
proceedings" exists. Fraudulent testimony upon which the court bases its decision is certainly an 
irregularity in the proceedings and reopening the case is appropriate in such a case. See Albin v. 
Illinois, 277 111. App. 3d 50, 660 N.E.2d 994, 1001 (1995) (false testimony by a material witness 
may alone be sufficient to warrant a new trial where the perjured testimony permeates the 
judicial process); In re Marriage of Clark, 813 S.W.2d 123, 125 (Mo. 1991) ("Granting a new 
trial on the ground of perjury rests within the discretion of the trial court"); Matter of Cook, 527 
A.2d 1115, 1116 (Pa. 1987) ("when the trial court concludes that a perjury has been committed, 
it is within the court's discretion to grant a new trial"). 
Subsection (3) provides that a new trial is appropriate in the case of "[a]ccident or 
surprise . . ." Exhibit 54, the Earnest Money Agreement upon which the Court relied in awarding 
damages to defendants, is within the ambit of subsection (3) because it was not presented to 
plaintiff prior to trial even though such a document should have been produced in accordance 
with ProMax's discovery requests and was objected to by plaintiff when introduced by the 
Mattsons as an exhibit at trial. 
Whether or not ordinary prudence should have required plaintiffs prior counsel to 
discover that Mr. Mattson offered false testimony is debatable; particularly when the amount 
plaintiff was seeking was approximately $15,000 and the counterclaim filed by defendants was 
202 paragraphs long containing 12 causes of action. Investigating ever) possible fact and 
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witness with such a counterclaim was viewed as prohibitively expensive by plaintiffs prior 
counsel. 
Mr. Mattson's fraudulent testimony related to the Mattsons' dealings with the potential 
buyers of the home. ProMax was not involved in those dealings. Therefore it would be unfair to 
insist that Mr. Mattson's fraudulent testimony relating to the failed sale of the home should have 
been exposed prior to or during the trial. This same argument applies to subsection (4) which 
allows a new trial for newly-discovered evidence. Plaintiffs Motion for Partial New Trial 
should not have been barred merely because plaintiffs prior counsel did not discover earlier that 
Mr. Mattson was not being truthful with the court. 
Subsection (5) permits a new trial if the damages awarded are "[e]xcessive or 
inadequate . . . " In addition to exposing Mr. Mattson's fraudulent testimony, ProMax also 
directed the court's attention to evidence establishing that the damages awarded were excessive. 
ProMax's motion is also appropriate under subsection (6), which allows a new trial if the 
evidence is not sufficient to justify a verdict. Plaintiff has made such a contention in this case. 
Subsection (7) provides that a new trial is appropriate if there as an error in law. The trial 
court has been informed that the Earnest Money Agreement, upon which the trial court based its 
award of damages, violates the statute of frauds. 
ProMax's request for the trial court to take additional evidence was appropriate not only 
under Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but also under Rule 60(b), which provides in 
relevant part as follows: 
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(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which 
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party:. . . (7) any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion 
shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not 
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The trial court refused to take additional evidence on the basis that it was allegedly 
untimely under Rule 59. However, setting aside a judgment under Rule 60(b) on the basis of 
fraud or misrepresentation requires only that the motion be made within three months after the 
judgment. The judgment in this case should have been set aside. 
The testimony of five individuals with no stake in this litigation resoundingly established 
that Mr. Mattson falsely testified before the trial court with respect to the failed sale of his home. 
Such conduct certainly falls within the parameters of Rule 59 and Rule 60(b). ProMax therefore 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's judgment or require the trial court to 
take additional evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the evidence presented herein, and particularly in light of the fact that the 
offer to purchase the Mattson home was never accepted, ProMax requests this Court to reverse 
the trial court's award of $170,000 for alleged tortious interference with the sale of the Mattson 
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home and ProMax also requests that this Court reverse the award of $23,000 for defects based 
upon the Court's ruling that the contract to build the home was for a set fee. ProMax, therefore, 
is entitled to recover in the amount of $14,533.22, plus attorneys' fees which shall be awarded 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18, the mechanic's lien statute. 
Alternatively, ProMax requests that the case be remanded so that the trial court may take 
additional evidence to clarify the court's numerous misunderstandings and findings that are 
inconsistent with the record. 
DATED this 3 ^ day of September, 1996. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Rex E/Madsen 
KoreyiiX Rasmussen 
David L. Pinkston 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
N\19057\1\APPEALBRF 
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ADDENDUM 
25-1-1 FORESTRY AND FIRE CONTROL V$k 
(3) Monies in the account shall be used as provided m 
Section 23-26-4. 
(4) The Wildlife Board shall report to the 1994 Legislature 
on funds received and programs developed. *" 3 
TITLE 24 
FORESTRY AND FIRE CONTROL 
(Repealed by Laws 1961, ch. 53, § 21; 1973, ch. 36, § 1; 




1. Fraudulent Conveyances [Repealed]. 
2. Sale of Merchandise in Bulk [Repealed]. 
3. Leases and Sales of Livestock [Repealed]. 
4. Marketing Wool [Repealed]. 
5. Statute of Frauds. 
6. Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
CHAPTER 1 
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES [REPEALED] 
25-1-1 to 25-1-16. Repealed. i W 
CHAPTER 2 
SALE OF MERCHANDISE IN BULK [REPEALED] 
25-2-1 to 25-2-5. Repealed. l**5 
CHAPTER 3 
LEASES AND SALES OF LIVESTOCK [REPEALED] 
25-3-1 to 25-3-4. Repealed. i#* 
CHAPTER 4 
MARKETING WOOL [REPEALED] 
25-4-1 to 25-4-3. Repealed. i#* 
CHAPTER 5 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Section 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. 
25-5-2. Wills and implied trusts excepted. 
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands. 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and signed. 
25-5-5. Representation as to credit of third person. 
25-5-6. Promise to answer for obligation of another ~~ 
When not required to be in writing. 
25-5-7. Contracts by telegraph deemed written. 
25-5-8. Right to specific performance not affected. 
25-5-9. Agent may sign for principal. 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. 
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases f° r 
a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over o r 
concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto, 
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared 
otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed o r 
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, gr*m 
ing, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by hi 
lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. it* 
25-5-2. Wills and implied trusts excepted. 
Section 25-5-1 shall not be construed to affect the power o; 
a testator in the disposition of his real estate by last will anc 
testament; nor to prevent any trust from arising or be^% 
extinguished by implication or operation of law. me 
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands. 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one 
year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, sfaall 
be void unless the contract, or some note or memorandum 
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the 
lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized in writing. X9& 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written £**d 
signed. 
The following agreements are void unless the agreement or 
some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, 
signed by the party to be charged with the agreement: 
(1) every agreement that by its terms is not to be 
nerfotmad within erne ysar from. the. making Q€ the. s^gCRft? 
ment; 
(2) every promise to answer for the debt, defaultt o r 
miscarriage of another; 
(3) every agreement, promise, or undertaking made 
upon consideration of marriage, except mutual promises 
to marry; 
(4) every special promise made by an executor or a<** 
ministrator to answer in damages for the liabilities, 0** *° 
pay the debts, of the testator or intestate out of his o*m 
estate; 
(5) every agreement authorizing or employing an a# e n t 
or broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation» 
(6) every credit agreement. 
(a) As used in Subsection (6): 
(i) "Credit agreement" means an agreement by 
a financial institution to lend, delay, or other^1^ 
modify an obligation to repay money, goodSf o r 
things in action, to otherwise extend credit, of *° 
make any other financial accommodate011-
"Credit agreement" does not include the u£ua* 
and customary agreements related to dep***1* 
accounts or overdrafts or other terms associate" 
with deposit accounts or overdrafts. 
(ii) "Creditor" means a financial instituflon 
which extends credit or extends a financial ac" 
commodation under a credit agreement wit*1 a 
debtor. 
(iii) "Debtor" means a person who seek* o r 
obtains credit, or seeks or receives a finan^1 
accommodation, under a credit agreement with a 
financial institution. 
(iv) "Financial institution" means a stat£ o r 
federally chartered bank, savings and loan a*80* 
ciation, savings bank, industrial loan corp^J3" 
tion, credit union, or any other institution vXP?* 
the jurisdiction of the commissioner of Finaxx^j 
Institutions as provided in Title 7, F i n a u ^ 
Institutions Act. 
(b) Except as provided in Subsection (6)(e)' 
debtor or a creditor may not maintain an action oQ 
credit agreement unless the agreement is in ^**JJ~! 
expresses consideration, sets forth the relevant te^r 
and conditions, and is signed by the party ^ZByZ 
whom enforcement of the agreement would , 
sought. For purposes of this act, a signed applies*10 
36-22-3 LIBRARIES 612 
(c) review the operations of the Division of Indian 
Affairs and other state agencies working with Utah Na-
tive American tribes; 
(d) help sponsor meetings and other opportunities for 
discussion with and between Native Americans. 
(2) In conducting its business, the committee shall comply 
with the rules of legislative interim committees. 1996 
36-22-3. Staff support. 
The Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel 
shall provide staff support to the committee. 1995 
TITLE 37 
LIBRARIES 
(Renumbered by Laws 1992, ch. 241, §§ 257, 
258, 260 to 304.) 
Chapter 
1. State Law Library [Renumbered]. 
2. City Libraries [Renumbered]. 
3. County Public Libraries [Renumbered]. 
4. State Library [Renumbered]. 
5. Depository Libraries [Renumbered]. 
CHAPTER 1 
STATE LAW LIBRARY 
(Renumbered by Laws 1992, ch. 241, 
§§ 272 to 283.) 
37-1-1 to 37-1-12. Renumbered as §§ 9-7-301 to 9-7-312. 
CHAPTER 2 
CITY LIBRARIES 
(Renumbered by Laws 1992, ch. 241, 
§§ 284 to 293.) 
37-2-1 to 37-2-10. Renumbered as §§ 9-7-401 to 9-7-410. 
CHAPTER 3 
COUNTY PUBLIC LIBRARIES 
(Renumbered by Laws 1992, ch. 241, 
§§ 294 to 304.) 
37-3-1 to 37-3-11. Renumbered as §§ 9-7-501 to 9-7-511. 
CHAPTER 4 
STATE LIBRARY 
(Renumbered by Laws 1992, ch. 241, §§ 258, 261 to 263, 
268, 269, 271.) 
37-4-1 to 37-4-10. Renumbered as 55 9-7-201, 9-7-204 to 
9-7-206, 9-7-211, 9-7-212, 9-7-214. 
CHAPTER 5 
DEPOSITORY LIBRARIES 
(Renumbered by Laws 1992, ch. 241, 55 257, 260, 264 to 
267, 270.) 
37-5-1 to 37-5-8. Renumbered as 55 9-7-101, 9-7-203, 




1. Mechanics' Liens. 
2. Miscellaneous Liens. 
3. Lessors' Liens. 
4. Common Carriers' Liens. 
5. Judgment Lien — United States Courts. 
6. Federal Tax Liens. 
7. Hospital Lien Law. 
8. Self-Service Storage Facilities. 
9. Penalty for Wrongful Lien. 
10. Oil, Gas, and Mining Liens. 
11. Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. 




38-1-1. Public buildings not subject to act. 
38-1-2. "Contractors" and "subcontractors" defined. 
38-1-3. Those entitled to lien — What may be attached. 
38-1-4. Amount of land affected — Lots and subdivisions 
— Franchises, fixtures, and appurtenances. 
38-1-5. Priority — Over other encumbrances. 
38-1-6. Priority over claims of creditors of original con-
tractor or subcontractor. 
38-1-7. Notice of claim — Contents — Recording — 
Service on owner of property. 
38-1-8. Liens on several separate properties in one 
claim. 
38-1-9. Notice imparted by record. 
38-1-10. Laborers' and materialmen's lien on equal footing 
regardless of time of filing. 
38-1-11. Enforcement — Time for — Lis pendens — Ac-
tion for debt not affected. 
38-1-12. Repealed. 
38-1-13. Parties — Joinder — Intervention. 
38-1-14. Decree — Order of satisfaction. 
38-1-15. Sale — Redemption — Disposition of proceeds. 
38-1-16. Deficiency judgment. 
38-1-17. Costs — Apportionment — Costs and attorneys' 
fee to subcontractor. 
38-1-18. Attorneys' fees. 
38-1-19. Payment by owner to contractor — Subcontrac-
tor's lien not affected. 
38-1-20. When contract price not payable in cash — 
Notice. 
38-1-21. Advance payments — Effect on subcontractor's 
lien. 
38-1-22. Advance payments under terms of contract — 
Effect on liens. 
38-1-23. Creditors cannot reach materials furnished, ex-
cept for purchase price. 
38-1-24. Cancellation of record — Penalty. 
38-1-25. Abuse of lien right — Penalty. 
38-1-26. Assignment of lien. 
38-1-27. Preliminary notice to original contractor — Form 
and contents — Service — Notice of commence-
ment of project or improvement. 
38-1-1. Public buildings not subject to act. ^ 
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any publfc^ 
building, structure or improvement. IBSSl 
613 LIENS 38-1" 
$8-1-2. ^Contractors* and* subcontractors* aenne<^ct 
Whoever shall do work or furnish materials by cont^^I 
express or imphed, with the owner, as in this chapter jh e r 
vided, shall be deemed an original contractor, and all ^ e d 
persons doing work or furnishing materials shall be dee^j^ 
subcontractors 
^^ ^ed. 
38-1-3. Those entitled to lien — What may be attacJ^y 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing
 e n t 
services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipr^™, 
used m the construction, alteration, or improvement of -ny 
building or structure or improvement to any premises in ^ g 
manner and licensed architects and engineers and arti^
 n s 
who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specificatr
 011 
drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendent' ^ 
who have rendered other like professional service, or besto
 m g 
labor, shall have a lien upon the property upon or concer^j.. 
which they have rendered service, performed labor, or j^e 
mshed or rented materials or equipment for the value of ^ n t 
service rendered, labor performed, or materials or equipi^^g 
furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at ^ s 
instance of the owner or of any other person acting by\.en 
authonty as agent, contractor, or otherwise except as the ^ e n 
is barred under Section 38-11-107 of the Residence K ^ 
Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act This hen shall a t ^ 
only to such interest as the owner may have in the prope^^ 
ifvi-
38-1-4. Amount of land affected — Lots and sub**^. 
sions — Franchises, fixtures, and app** 
nances.
 v e r 
The hens granted by this chapter shall extend to and c°
 o r 
so much of the land whereon such building, structuring, 
improvement shall be made as may be necessary for c^^ng 
nient use and occupation of the land In case any such bu^^l^ 
shall occupy two or more lots or other subdivisions of * ^Q 
such lots or subdivisions shall be considered as one fo*"
 ter 
purposes of this chapter The hens provided for m this c b ^ ^ ^ 
shall attach to all franchises, privileges, appurtenances^
 e c -
to all machinery and fixtures, pertaining to or used in co**^ve_ 
taon with any such lands, buildings, structures, or i m p ^ 9 8 7 
ments 
38-1-5. Priori ty — Over other encumbrances . j ^ e 
The hens herein provided for shall relate back to, and r,
 o r 
effect as of, the time of the commencement to do wof^ve_ 
furnish materials on the ground for the structure or imp^L e r 
ment, and shall have priority over any hen, mortgage or ° fae 
encumbrance which may have attached subsequently XP
 m_ 
tune when the building, improvement or structure was c ^ue 
menced, work begun, or first material furnished oi*
 0 f 
ground, also over any hen, mortgage or other encumbral*c ie(j 
which the hen holder had no notice and which was u n r e e l 
pitspefty, OT some pati di tne property, is situated, a wi** 
notice to hold and claim a hen within 90 days from the 0\„ 
(a) the person last performed labor or service of * 
furnished equipment or material on a project or imp*' V 
ment for a residence as denned in Section 38-11-10^' 
(b) of final completion of an original contract n0^ 
volving a residence as defined in Section 38-11-102 
(2) This notice shall contain a statement setting forth,
 n 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, v 
known, the name of the record owner; 
(b) the name of the person by whom he was empr 
or to whom he furnished the equipment or matenah
 w „ 
(c) the tame when the first and last labor or service
 Wg 
performed or the first and last equipment or materia) 
furnished,
 t , 
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for ide^ 
cation, and 
(e) the signature of the hen claimant or his a u t h o ^ e 
agent and an acknowledgment or certificate as requ x 
under Title 57, Chapter 3, Recording of Documents
 t l c 
acknowledgment or certificate is required for any n^ 
filed after April 29, 1985, and before Apnl 24, 1989 <le 
(3) Within 30 days after filing the notice of hen, the
 t^ 
claimant shall deliver or mail by certified mail to eithe^v 0 
reputed owner or record owner of the real property a cofno 
the notice of hen If the record owner's current address i^ +u 
last-known address of the record owner, using the nam^5
 m 
addresses appearing on the last completed real p r ^ y lc 
assessment rolls of the county where the affected prop^^
 t^ e 
located Failure to deliver or mail the notice of hen t°
 a n t 
reputed owner or record owner precludes the hen cla****teG 
from an award of costs and attorneys' fees against the reP
 1995 
owner or record owner in an action to enforce the hen 
one 
L#nts 
38-1-8. Liens on several s eparate properties ii* 
c laim. 
Liens against two or more buildings or other improve*** j 3 U t 
owned by the same person may be included m one clan**'
 tke 
in such case the person filing the claim must designate
 $ o r 
amount claimed to be due to him on each of such buildif*^9g7 
other improvements 
38-1-9. Not ice imparted by record . 
(1) The recorder must record the claim m an index & 
tamed for that purpose
 on3 
(2) From the time the claim is filed for record, all ve \wi 
are considered to have notice of the claim 
diial 
38-1-10. Laborers' and materia lmen's l ien on #H 
foot ing regardless of t ime of filing. J as 
a ^ 
commenced, work begun, or first material furnished o&
 M 
ground 
^38-1-6. Priori ty over c la ims of credi tors of o r * ^ ^ 
»L contractor or subcontractor.
 tt0n 
&No attachment, garnishment or levy under an e x ^ J r n e r 
frpon any money due to an original contractor from the °
 A\i^ 
m any property subject to hen under this chapter shall b^ v*
 n o 
tto against any hen of a subcontractor or materialman, & ^ 
guch attachment, garnishment or levy upon any money ^
 D e 
f* subcontractor or materialman from the contractor s b ^ \
 o r 
galid as against any hen of a laborer employed by the ^\9^ 
88-1-7. Not ice of c laim — Contents — Recordi*1^ 
Service on o w n e r of property. . ^ j e 
M l ) A person claiming benefits under this chapter sh^J* ^ 
fftt record with the county recorder of the county in whi^*1 
The hens for work and labor done or material furnishings 
provided in this chapter shall be upon an equal icO ^ ^ 
regardless of the time of performing such work and W* 9^53 
furnishing such material 
ei& 38-1-11. Enforcement — Time for — Lis p e n d ^ 
Act ion for debt not affected. y e n 
(1) A hen claimant shall file an action to enforce t& 
filed under this chapter within
 t 9 0O\ of 
(a) twelve months from the date of final comply £jj e ( | 
the original contract not involving a residence as d* 
in Section 38-11-102, or j^st 
(b) 180 days from the date the hen daimaH*
 n t 
performed labor and services or last furnished GQ^Sg^ii-
or material for a residence, as defined in Section * 
102. Lzb*fc-(2) (a) Within the tune period provided for filing in S u
 t n e 
tion (1) the hen claimant shall file for record w i ^
 w 
county recorder of each county in which the I1 
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recorded a notice of the pendency of the action, in the 
manner provided in actions affecting the title or r ight to 
possession of real property, or the lien shall be void, except 
as to persons who have been made parties to the action 
and persons having actual knowledge of the commence-
ment of the action. 
(b) The burden of proof shall be upon the lien claimant 
and those claiming under him to show actual knowledge. 
(3) This section may not be interpreted to impair or affect 
the right of any person to whom a debt may be due for any 
Work done or materials furnished to maintain a personal 
action to recover the same. 1995 
38-1-12. R e p e a l e d . 1981 
38-1-13. Par t ies — Joinder — Intervention. 
Lienors not contesting the claims of each other may join as 
plaintiffs, and when separate actions are commenced the court 
may consolidate them and make all persons having claims 
filed parties to the action. Those claiming liens who fail or 
refuse to become parties plaintiff may be made parties defen-
dant, and any one not made a party may at any time before the 
final hearing intervene. 1953 
38-1-14. Decree — Order of satisfaction. 
la every case la which 2ieas are claimed against the same 
property the decree shall provide for their satisfaction in the 
following order: 
(1) Subcontractors who are laborers or mechanics 
working by the day or piece, but without furnishing 
materials therefor; 
(2) All other subcontractors and all materialmen; 
(3) The original contractors. 1953 
58-1-15. Sale — Redemption — Disposition of pro-
ceeds. 
The court shall cause the property to be sold in satisfaction 
Qf the liens and costs as in the case of foreclosure of mortgages, 
Subject to the same right of redemption. If the proceeds of sale 
^fter the payment of costs shall not be sufficient to satisfy the 
Vhole amount of liens included in the decree, then such 
proceeds shall be paid in the order above designated, and pro 
*ata to the persons claiming in each class where the sum 
Realized is insufficient to pay the persons of such class in full. 
Any excess shall be paid to the owner. 1953 
§8-1-16. Def ic iency j u d g m e n t . 
Every person whose claim is not satisfied as herein provided 
*hay have judgment docketed for the balance unpaid, and 
Execution therefor against the par ty personally liable. 1953 
58-1-17. Costs — Apportionment — Costs and attor-
neys' fee to subcontractor. 
Except as provided in Section 38-11-107, as between the 
Owner and the contractor the court shall apportion the costs 
According to the right of the case, but in all cases each 
Subcontractor exhibiting a lien shall have his costs awarded to 
*tim, including the costs of preparing and recording the notice 
Of claim of lien and such reasonable attorneys' fee as may be 
incurred in preparing and recording said notice of claim of 
lien. 1996 
38-1-18. Attorneys' fees. 
Except as provided in Section 38-11-107, in any action 
brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful 
Party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to 
te fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the 
Action. 1995 
38-1-19. Payment by owner to contractor — Subcon-
tractor's lien not affected. 
' When any subcontractor shall have actually begun to fur-
bish labor or materials for which he is entitled to a lien no 
payment to the original contractor shall impair or defeat such 
lien; and no alteration of any contract shall affect any Uen 
acquired under the provisions of this chapter. 1953 
38-1-20. When contract price not payable in cash — 
Notice. 
As to all liens, except that of the contractor, the whole 
contract price shall be payable in money, except as herein 
provided, and shall not be diminished by any prior or subse-
quent indebtedness, offset or counterclaim in favor of the 
owner and against the contractor, except when the owner has 
contracted to pay otherwise than in cash, in which case the 
owner shall post in a conspicuous place on the premises a 
statement of the terms and conditions of the contract before 
materials are furnished or labor is performed, which notice 
must be kept posted, and when so posted shall give notice to 
all parties interested of the terms and conditions of the 
contract. Any person willfully tearing down or defacing such 
notice is guilty of a misdemeanor. 1953 
38-1-21. Advance payments — Effect on subcontrac-
tor's lien. 
No payment made prior to the time when the same is due 
under the terms and conditions of the contract shall be valid 
for the purpose of defeating, diminishing or discharging any 
lien in favor of any person except the contractor; but as to any 
such lien such payment shall be deemed as if not made, 
notwithstanding that the contractor to whom it was paid may 
thereafter abandon his contract or be or become indebted to 
the owner for damages for nonperformance of his contract or 
otherwise. 1953 
38-1-22. Advance payments under terms of contract — 
Effect on liens. 
The subcontractors' liens provided for in this chapter shall 
extend to the full contract price, but if at the time of the 
commencement to do work or furnish materials the owner has 
paid upon the contract, in accordance with the terms thereof, 
any portion of the contract price, either in money or property, 
the lien of the contractor shall extend only to such unpaid 
balance, and the lien of any subcontractor who has notice of 
such payment shall be limited to the unpaid balance of the 
contract price. No part of the contract price shall by the terms 
of any contract be made payable, nor shall the same or any 
part thereof be paid in advance of the commencement of the 
work, for the purpose of evading or defeating the provisions of 
this chapter. 1953 
38-1-23. Creditors cannot reach materials furnished, 
except for purchase price. 
Whenever materials have been furnished for use in the 
construction, alteration or repair of any building, work or 
other improvement mentioned in Section 38-1-3 such materi-
als shall not be subject to attachment, execution or other legal 
process to enforce any debt due by the purchaser of such 
materials, other than a debt due for the purchase money 
thereof, so long as in good faith the same are about to be 
applied to the construction, alteration or repair of such build-
ing or improvement. 1953 
38-1-24. Cancellation of record — Penalty. 
The claimant of any lien filed as provided herein, on the 
payment of the amount thereof together with the costs in-
curred and the fees for cancellation, shall at the request of any 
person interested in the property charged therewith cause 
Said lien to be canceled of record within ten days from the 
request, and upon failure to so cancel his lien within the time 
aforesaid shall forfeit and pay to the person making the 
request the sum of $20 per day until the same shall be 
tanceled, to be recovered in the same manner as other debts-




388-1-25. Abuse of lien right — Penalty. 
>Any person who knowingly causes to be filed for reco^, 
•claim of lien against any property, which contains a gr^^, 
tdemand than the sum due him, with the intent to clouc^  ., 
title, or to exact from the owner or person liable by m e a ^ ® 
'such excessive claim of lien more than is due him, Q^ 
"procure any advantage or benefit whatever, is guilty
 Q* 
misdemeanor. ^ 
38-1-26. Assignment of lien. 
s All liens under this chapter shall be assignable as QM 
choses in action, and the assignee may commence and £^ e r 
.ecute actions thereon in his own name in the manner h^ ( 
•provided. 
88-1-27. Preliminary notice to original contractor _ 
Form and contents — Service — Notic^ -
commencement of project or improveme*^ 
(1) This section relating to preliminary notices does * 
apply to residential construction or to work performed in J° 
•construction. For the purposes of this section, residen^ , 
construction means single family detached housing and m> . 
tifamily attached housing up to and including fourplexes, ^ " 
includes rental housing. 
(2) Except subcontractors who are in privity of contr* 
with an original contractor or except for persons performs 
labor for wages, any person claiming, reserving the right
 f 
.claim, or intending to claim a mechanic's lien under t l . 
'chapter for labor, service, equipment, or material shall prov} , 
preliminary notice to the original contractor as prescribed \ 
this section. Any person who fails to provide this prelimin^ ^ 
^otice has no right to claim a mechanic's lien under tjkV 
chapter. 
or his address as shown on the notice of commence 
^ent 
$ec-
jn writing and may be given at any time during the course 
the project or improvement. 
(4) A person required by this section to give prelimin^ 
.notice is only required to give one notice for each project ^ 
improvement, which may include an entire structure o^or 
scheme of improvements. a 
(^5) If the labor, service, equipment, or material is furnish , 
pursuant to contracts with more than one subcontractor 
jrith more than one original contractor, the notice requi^or 
ments must be met with respect to the labor, service, equ^e" 
ment, or materials furnished to each such subcontractor **~ 
. (6) The person required by this section to give preliminai 
notice is precluded from making a claim for any labor, servic"^ 
equipment, or material which was provided more than 45 da]e ' 
prior to the date the preliminary notice is given. The prelin/.8 
nary notice must be given before a notice of lien is filed wit!* 
the county recorder pursuant to Section 38-1-7. 
(7) The preliminary notice under this section shall includ 
(a) the name, address, and telephone number of tr6, 
person furnishing the labor, service, equipment, or mat<ie 
rial; s" 
(b) the name and address of the person who contracte , 
for the furnishing of the labor, service, equipment, c 
material; and ) r 
(c) the address of the project or improvement or 
drawing sufficient to describe the location of the project ca 
improvement. >r 
(8) (a) Service of a preliminary notice is sufficient if th 
notice is deposited in the United States mail, certified cie 
registered, return receipt requested, postage prepaiir 
Service of the preliminary notice by mail is complete upo 
deposit of the certified or registered mail. • n 
'M A nroliminarv notice served by mail may be ac. 
on record with the county recorder as required by Suk 
tion (10). 
(9) The applicability of this section, including the waiw 
rights or privileges granted or protected by this section, J|" 
not be varied by agreement. ^ 
(10) Any right to assert a defense of failure to comply w. , 
the preliminary notice requirements of this section is 71 r? 
unless the original contractor records a notice of comnw 
ment of the project or improvement with the county reco??6" 
for the county or counties where the project is located wu? e r 
30 days after commencement of the project. The noti^ *! 
commencement shall include the following: 
(a) the name and address of the owner of the proj^ f 
improvement; o r 
(b) the name and address of the original contract^ 
(c) the name and address of the surety providing ' 
payment bond for the project or improvement, or if ^ y 
exists, a statement that a payment bond was not req\K ne, 
for the work being performed; 
(d) the name and address of the project; and 
(e) a legal description of the property on which ., 
project is located. 
*991 
Vs 
(3) The preliminary notice required by this section shall * 












Lien on livestock — For feed and care. 
Liens of hotels and boardinghouse keepers 
Repairman's lien on personal property — 
subject to rights of secured parties. 
Special lien on personal property for servi 
rendered — General lien of dry cleaning esK f 
lishments, laundries, and shoe repair shop* 
Sale of unclaimed personal property. 
Disposal of property by lienholder — Procedu 
Action for deficiency. 
'*en 
38-2-1. Lien on livestock — For feed and care. 
Every ranchman, farmer, agistor, herder of cattle, tew^ 
keeper or livery stable keeper to whom any domestic aninv, 
shall be entrusted for the purpose of feeding, herding 
pasturing shall have a lien upon such animals for the amow-
that may he due him for such feeding, herding orpasturix 
and is authorized to retain possession of such animals un^t 
«s such amount is paid. *• 
38-2-2. Liens of hotels and boardinghouse keepers. 
Every innkeeper, hotel keeper, boardinghouse ^ 
lodginghouse keeper shall have a lien on the baggage a j j 
other property in and about such inn belonging t o - . ^ ^ T e r 
control of his guests or boarders for the proper chargesJK^ 
him for their accommodation, board and lodging, fofJB?*J?jfr 
paid for or advanced to them, and for such other ?f???? * f § i 
furnished at their request. The innkeeper, Hotel keeper^Djw^ 
inghouse or lodginghouse keeper may detain *^jf@£!& 
and other property until the amount of such charge ttpal^ 
and the baggage and other property shall ^ ^ ? ? S 5 $ ^ " 
attachment or execution until the Hotel or : boarding 
keeper's lien and the costs of enforcing it J ^ K j S f e p ^ S 
38-2-3. Repairman's lien on personal V™gjffi<- ^ ^ 
subject to rights ot secured P**1*£*; 
Every person who shall make, ^j^JSg^f 
labor upon, any article of personal P r ^ P ^ § ^ S K 
the owner or other person entitled to ~*~~ 
have a lien upon such article for t n e ^ ~ - - , - j -
i.i™ ~^nm*A flI1d materials furnisbedan*"?* 
Rule 59 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 614 
with the clerk of the district court in any other county where 
the judgment may have been docketed. Thereupon a similar 
entry in the judgment docket shall be made by the clerk of 
such court; and such entry shall have the same effect as in the 
county where the same was originally entered. 
Rule 59, New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new 
trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or 
part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, 
however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried 
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has 
been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of 
fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclu-
sions, and direct the entry of a new judgment:: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or 
adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of 
discretion by which either party was prevented from 
having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or 
more of the jurors have been induced to assent to any 
general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question 
submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determina-
tion by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct 
may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence 
could not have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party 
making the application, which he could not, with reason-
able diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to 
have been given under the influence of passion or preju-
dice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or 
other decision, or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be 
served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a 
hew trial is made under Subdivision (aXD, (2), (3), or (4), it 
shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new 
trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the 
motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within 
which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may 
be extended for an additional period not exceeding 20 days 
either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties by 
written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court of its own initiative may order a 
new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new 
trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the 
grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to 
ulter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 
days after entry of the judgment. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, 
orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising 
from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at 
any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and 
after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the 
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected 
before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and 
thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected 
with leave of the appellate court 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly 
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such 
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final ju<u 
ment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: Qi 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect* vr\ 
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could' not 
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an 
adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an 
action has not been personally served upon the defendant as 
required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in 
said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon 
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it 
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospec-
tive application; or (7) any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not 
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding 
was entered or taken. Amotion under this Subdivision (b) does 
not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. 
This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order 
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the 
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment 
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an 
independent action. 
Rule 61. Harmless error. 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evi-
dence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in 
anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties, 
is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a 
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears 
to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at 
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or 
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial 
rights of the parties. 
Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment 
(a) Stay upon entry of judgment . Execution or other 
proceedings to enforce a judgment may issue immediately 
upon the entry of the judgment, unless the court in its 
discretion and on such conditions for the security of the 
adverse party as are proper, otherwise directs. 
(b) Stay on motion for new trial or for judgment. In its 
discretion and on such conditions for the security of the 
adverse party as are proper, the court may stay the execution 
of, or any proceedings to enforce, a judgment pending the 
disposition of a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend a 
judgment made pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion for relief 
from a judgment or order made pursuant to Rule 60, or of a 
motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for a directed 
verdict made pursuant to Rule 50, or of a motion for amend-
ment to the findings or for additional findings made pursuant 
to Rule 52(b). 
(c) Injunction pending appeal* When an appeal is taken 
from an interlocutory or final judgment granting, dissolving, 
or denying an injunction, the court in its discretion may 
suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the 
pendency of the appeal upon such conditions as it consider* 
proper for the security of the rights of the adverse party. 
(d) Stay upon appeal. When an appeal is taken the 
appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may obtain a stay, 
unless such a stay is otherwise prohibited by law or the** 
rules. The bond may be given at or after the time of filing tb« 
notice of appeal. The stay is effective when the supersedes* 
bond is approved by the court. 
(e) Stay in favor of the state, or agency thereof. When 
an appeal is taken by the United States, the state of Utah, & 
an officer or agency of either, or by direction of any department 
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Tar & Termite 
Back Fill 
Fill Garage/Basement 
Dirt HauJin* In/Out 
Bsmt Cement Labor 
Basement Cement 
Garage Cement Lab 
j 25 (Garage Cemnet 
20 | Yard Lines SWP 1 
104 (Cut Approach 1 
27 (FramingLabor 1 
26 ! Framing Material ' 
30 (Windows j 
I 30 iBaseroentWindows 
35 (ExteriorDoors | 
96 ^Special Tub 
( 36 [Roofing j 
49 (Fireplace Unit j 
| 43 j Heating 
48 (Air Conditioning 
I 20 (Plumbing j 

























I 400.00 1 
! 12000.00 j 
i 25000.00 ' 
j 5CC0.C0 i 
1 1 
1 ! 
! IOOO.OO i 
1 1500.00 1 
! 1200.00! 
! 3000.00 1 
1 2200.00 | 
| 6000.00 j 
I 65CO.0O ! 
101 (Vacuum 1 I 6CO.0O ( 
4? : Alarm 1 
j 50 i Brick or Stone j 
57 {Insulation 1 
1 | 
I 2500.CO.1 
j 25CO.CO ) 
85 lExtFlatworkLabor" { 1 25CO.00 ,f 
| 85 1 Ext Flatwork Cement | | 25CO.00 | 
65 iGtnzcDooc | ) 1200.00/ 
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CONSTRUCTION COST BREAKDOWN-LOT 641 
ADDRESS: 6642 So. Stone Mil! Drive 
BUYER: Matt Mattson 
Bank 
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110 i Q e a n up Inside 
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105 ! Final Grading 
103 iGutierine 
4CO/0 O.CO ! 
O.CO 
O.CO j 
0.CO I o. 
310 IMisc Costs ~><Y\ff\ 1117.50 HI 7 50! •W 
106 'Landscaping 0.00 O.CO ! 
106 (Fencing O.CO ' o.co :• 
iConst. Posing Costs O.CO ; u.w i 
67 I Const. Loan Cost 
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WHEN RECORDED. HAIL Ttf; 
DILLMAN ELECTRIC 
1034? South Lor1dan Lane 
Sandy. Utah 84U9Z 
$?q?\)o 
RECORDED ATRajUBT OF 
eoumr RECORDER 
m, low DEPUTE <s»<e* 
N O T I C E OF L I E N 
The undersigned LANE DILLMAN for DILLMAN ELECTRIC 
hereby gives notice of intention to hold and claim a a sole proprletorsnip " nciCUj y 
J^OT.<h*BffT^^ 0Wned byc5Unl7r 
p H ^ S ^ ^ T ' l T O Utah 84065-4104 
PROPERTY ADEKCSS: 6642 South Stone Mill Drive - Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
ALL OF LOT 641, MILL HOLLOW ESTATES - PUT "F" SUBDIVISION 
(22-23-302-022) 
•The amount demanded hereby 1s $ 14,000.00 + $loq Lien Fee + lWntPerMonth + Atty Fees 
owing to the undersigned for *furn1shing materials used in *performing labor upon the 
construction ^alteration *add1t1on to *repa1r of a *bu1ld1ng *structure ^improvement 
upon the above described property. +STRIKE OUT UNNECESSARY WORDS 
The undersigned *furn1shed said materials to *was employed by Matt Mattson 
who was the purported owner/contractor 
. such being done by the underslqned by the terms and con-
ditions of which the undersigned did agree to furnish labor and materials for the 
Installation of the rough & finish electrlcaTsystems. 
in consideration of paymenj; to .the undersigned therefore as follows; 30 days net - Payment 
1n full upon completion of claimants work. 
and under which contract the first ^material was furnished *labor was performed on the 
14th day of Oune , 1993 and the last was so furnished or performed on the 
13th day of August , 1993 and for all of which "^materials *labor the undersigned 
became entitled to $ l4T000.00 , which 1s the reasonable value thereof, and on which 
payments have been made and credits and offsets allowed amounting to $ -0-
leaving a balance owing to the undersigned of $ 14,000.00 after deducting all just 
credits and offsets, and for which demand the undersigned holds and claims a Hen by 
virtue of the provisions of Chapter 1, Title 38, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as Amended. 
DATED:31 August 1993 
STATE OF UTAH 





_, belno first duly sworn deposes and says that 
of Dlllman Electric he/xJ» is the owner _ _ _ _ ^ _ _ 
1n the foregoing rtotice of Lien; that hefall* has read and knows of the contents thereof 
"
hlth ? ? * t r u V $ *2 h l s M « * ° ™ knowledge and belief; and that he/SK* has appropriate 
authority to sign the foregoing Notice of L1en on behalf of the Hen claimant, a< U s 
Acknowledged, subscribed and sworn before me this 









*HEN RECORDED. MAJfTO: 
MEHR'MAID POOL EQUIPMENT SALES, INC, 
7515 South State Street 
Mldvale. Utah 84047 
RECOTOEDATRHHJESrOF 
M%*J?^!£ *"u""""r *********** 
OWE /^ff Mfit&l'tf* 
MIH NXON 
D B V m 
k riMECOUWYRECOOa 
55*15111 
N O T I C E O F L I E N 
The undersigned DONNA S. MEHR for MEHR MAID POOL EQUIPMENT SALFS. INC. 
hereby gives notice of Intention tofiold ana c m m a 
lien upon the property and improvements thereon owned and reputed to be owned by 
MATTHEW C. * SHERI M. MATTSON, h/w, J.T. and located in SALT LAKE County, 
Utah, more particularly described as follows: 
OWNERS ADDRESS: 11848 South Buckwheat Way - Riverton, Utah 84065-4104 
pRQPEkTV AbDftESS: 6642 South Stone Mill Drive - Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
ALL OF LOT 641, MILL HOLLOW ESTATES - PLAT MF" SUBDIVISION 
(22-23-302-022) 
The amount demanded hereby is $3,250.00 + $100 Lien Fee + 2%IntPerMonth + Atty Fees 
owing to the undersigned for ^ furnishing materials used 1n *perform1ng labor upon the 
construction *alteration *addit1on to *repa1r of a *bu1lding ^structure ^improvement 
upon the above described property, »STRIK£ OUT UNNECESSARY WORDS 
The undersigned ^furnished said materials to *was employed by Matt Mattson . 
6550 South 900 East SLC,UT8412i.who was the purported owner/developer 
, such being done by the undersigned by the terms and con-
ditions of which the undersigned did agree tofurnlsh labor, materials & equipment for the 
installation of an Indoor 16' X 36' pool with all attendant operation equipment associateftheret 
in consideration of payment to the undersigned therefore as follows: Prnqrp^ivp paympnt-* 
with paympnt in full upon completion of claimants work 
and under which contract tne first *materia1 was furnished *labor was performed on the 
12th day of April , 1993 and the last was so furnished or performed on the 
13th day of August , 1993 and for all of which ^materials *labor the undersigned 
became entitled to $ 3,250.00 , which is the reasonable value thereof, and on which 
payments have been made and credits and offsets allowed amounting to $ -0- • 
leaving a balance owing to the undersigned of $3,250.00 after deducting all just 
credits and offsets, and for which demand the undersigned holds and claims a lien by 
virtue of the provisions of Chapter 1, Title 38, UtahJSode Annotated, 1953, as Amended. 
DATED:1 September 1993 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
Donna S. Mehr 
Jtah de An otated, 1953, as / 
MEHR MAID PQQL EQUIPMENT SALES, INC. 
) 
ss. 
. being first duly sworn deposes and says that 
flBCshe 1s the secretary/treasurer of Mehr Main Pool Equipment Sales, Inc. 
in the foregoing Notice of L1en; t h a t W s h e has read and knows of the contents thereof 
which are true as toXWWher own knowledge and belief; and thatXWUtshe has appropriate 
authority to sign the foregoing Notice of Lien on behalf of the Hen claimant, as its 
secretary/treasurer pursuant to corporate resolution; and that KiWshe 
acknowledged to me. thatXXtfshe executed the same. f ) s *n /? 
Acknowledged, subscribed and sworn before me this 
of September
 % ig93 
1st day 
WM.IxSSaL^HNSONi 
445 East 200 Sort) #S | 
earUtoC*/. Utah 64111! 
j \ . f) /ILIJLK, (/Jark-
WHEN RECORDED. M A I l O ) : 
BMC WEST BUILDING MATERIALS 
JW2 South 1410 West S t r e e T 
West Jordan, Utah U40im ~" 
The undersigned JAMES R< 
RtttaUEDAT REQUEST Of 
PPM* j g ^ t i / pt/p** 
N O T I C E O F L I E N 
BUCKNER, SR., for BMC WEST BUILDING MATERIALS 
hereby gives notice of Intention to hold and claim a 
lien upon the property and improvements thereon owned and reputed to be owned by 
MATTHEW C« & SHERI H. MATTSON, h/w, J.T. and located in SALT LAKE 
Utah, more particularly described as follows: 
OWNERS ADDRESS: 11848 South Buckwheat Way - Rlverton, Utah 84065-4104 
PROPERTY ADDRESS: 6642 South Stone Mill Drive - Salt Lake City. Utah 84121 
County, 
ALL OF LOT 641, MILL HOLLOW ESTATES - PLAT "F" SUBDIVISION 
(22-23-302-022) 
The amount demanded hereby 1s $ 6,079.85 + $100 Lien Fee + ^ " ^ ^ " ^ ^ *tty FeeS 
owing to the undersigned for *furn1sh1ng materials used 1n * $ W f i ^ the 
construction Alteration *add1tion to ^ repair of a *bu11ding *structure *1mprovement 
upon the above described property. +STRIKE OUT UNNECESSARY WORDS 
The undersigned *furn1shed said materials to *was employed by Matt Mattson 
who was the purported owner/contractor 
. such being done by the undersigned by the terms and con-
ditions of which the undersigned did agree to furnish building materials 
in consideration of payment to the undersigned therefore as follows: 2% by the 10th of 
the month - 30 days net. _r_r_^_^T_1 
and under which contract the first *material was furnished *labor was performed on the 
30th day of April 19 93 and the last was so furnished or performed on the 
16th day of August 19 93 and for all of which ^materials *labor the undersigned 
became entitled to $6,079.85 which is the reasonable* value thereof, and on which 
payments have been made and credits and offsets allowed amounting to $ -0- • 
leaving a balance owing to the undersigned of $ 6,079.85 after deducting all just 
credits and offsets, and for which demand the undersigned holds and claims a lien by 
virtue of the provisions of Chapter 1, Title 38, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as Amended. 
WVEDz 2 September 1993 (W,^  
BMC WEST BUILDING MATERIALS 
ss. 
being first duly sworn deposes and says that 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE j 
. tlamp* R- Rnrknor . Sr( _ , ^ j _ , . — - - » - *~J* * . , » * 
heA**X is the Administrative Manager of BMC WEST BUILDING MATERIALS 
in the foregoing nonce or Lien; that heMM has read and knows of the contents thereof 
which are true as to h1s/ftt»xown knowledge and belief; and that he**frx has appropriate 
authority to sign the foregoing Notice of L1en on behalf of the HehTlaimant, as Its 
Administrative Manager _ . pursuant to corporate resolution; and that he WW 
cKnowieoged to me that he/teWt executed the same. . * ^ 




aj/d swoi rn before me 
19 93 
t h i s 2nd day 
MMlfP 
flHEN RECORDED. HAIL TO; 
RFWPRAUPLUMBINR CONTRACTORS 
Q M O South Indian Ridge Drive 
Sandy. Utah 84092 





T h e u n d e r s i g n e d SCOTT G. 
DEPUTft 




N . O I ! C £ 0 £ lllH 
STOWERS for GENERAL-PLUMBING CONTRACTORS-
hereby gives notice of intention to hold and claim a 
Hen upon'the property and Improvements thereon owned and reputed to be owned by 
MATTHEW C. * SHERI N. MATTSON.;h/w. J.T. and located in SALT LAKE County, 
Utah, more particularly described as follows: 
OWNERS ADDRESS: 11848 South .Buckwheat Way - Rlverton, Utah 84065-4104 
PROPERTY ADD"KESS: 6642 South Stone M111 Drive - Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
ALL OF LOT 641, MILL HOLLOW ESTATES - PLAT «F" SUBDIVISION 
(22-23-302-022) 
The amount demanded hereby 1s $6.438.95 + $100 Lien Fee + IWntPerMonth + Atty Fegs 
owing to the undersigned for *furn1sh1ng materials used In *perform1ng labor upon the 
construction ^alteration 'addition to *repa1r of a *bu11d1ng *structure *1mprovement 
upon the above described property. 'STRIKE OUT UNNECESSARY WORDS 
The undersigned *fum1shed said materials to *was employed by Matt Mat-.t.^ nn 
t who was the purported ownpr/contractor. 
, such being done by the undersigned by the terms and con-
dltlons of which the undersigned did agree to furnish labor and materials for the Install-
ation of the finish plumbing systems & extras. ^ . 
in consideration of payment to the undersigned therefore as follows: Progressive Payments 
with payment In full upon completion of claimants work. 
and under which contract the first *material was furnished *labor was performed on the jjBjLfcday of, 
jfay of JlajL. 1993 and the last was so furnished or performed on the 3rd d of September t 19 93 and for all of which ^materials *1abor the undersigned 
became entitled to $ 6.438.95 , which Is the reasonable value thereof, and on which 
payments have been made and credits and offsets allowed amounting to $ _ _ - 0 -
leaving a balance owing to the undersigned of $ 6,438.95 after deducting all just 
zredits and offsets, and for which demand the undersigned holds and claims a Hen by 
/Irtue of the provisions of Chapter 1, Title 38, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as Amended. 
W E D : 3 September 1993 &f.i.ti 
GENERAL-PLUMBING CONTRACTORS 
TATE OF UTAH 
QUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
Scott G. Stowers 
: ss. 
, being first duly sworn deposes and says that 
of General-Plumbing Contractors V*a« 1s the owner _ „ „ 
i the foregoing Wotice of Lien; that he&ft* has read and knows of the contents thereof 
!u ?r* *"**** *? hls^eoxown knowledge and belief; and that he/jbevhas appropriate 
thorlty to sign the foregoing Notice of L1en on behalf of the Hen claimant, as Its 
v ^ L l n . , 1 f W B f l i L , u ^ •WWWp«XlWXflWW^ and that he/xXK 
knowledge* to me that he/*&& executed the same. 
Acknowledged, subscribed and sworn before me this 
of September 
3rd day 
w.rr_ Mr*«w*X JOHNSON f 
444 & « 200 South #6 I 
• r t t l j f r t C*y, Utah 64111 { 
Vy Commit tiro ExcfcM I 
ytteUrf? 




Wm. Lowell Johnson 
Sue Burningham 
445 East 200 South, Suite 5 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
14 September 1993 
Bus. Phone: 
(801) 363-0071 
Matthew C. & Sheri K. Mattson 
11848 South Buckwheat Way 
Riverton, Utah 
84065-4104 
Dear Mr. & Mrs. Mattson: RE: NOTICE OF LIEN 
Please be advised that on 3 September 1993, a lien was placed of record at the 
Salt Lake County Recorder's office by Stenton W. Wilcox & Associates, 3843 
Tangiers Circle, West Valley City, Utah 84119 (see copy attached) in the amount 
of $3,488.25 plus interest and fees. 
This lien is for labor and materials furnished to the property described in the 
Notice of Lien, and represents an obligation which you are responsible for. 
Please contact Stenton W. Wilcox, telephone (801) 964-1147, or c/o Stenton W. 
Wilcox & Associates, afore-mentioned address, regarding payment of this matter. 
Sincerely, 




CONTEMPORARY FURNITURE, INC. 0551v 
•.' \j U w - —- —- — 
Ccrontemporary 
rurniture ' 
6550 SOUTH 900 EAST • (801) 262-9608 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84121 
8-91 WEST ONE BANK, UTAH 
P.O. BOX 30177 








DATE CHECK AMOUNT 
^7-^7-?^ -?,&#'• 
I OH- OO - S 739l,-i3 c c J. 3 is' i: I t itOGODt, li; L 10 10 E 3 2 111* 7* 
~*Z-u*£k>?*'- •: • •• -*F.4h: - «•. .* •&*- •• •-• '#,|AC->".-? '&*&-; > ^ s^'^STMrs? 'rn." 
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: 
f * 
STFNTON w. uTirny t / K W T A T P ; 
843 Tanoiers Circle 
Wpst VallPv IMtv. I l f h M11Q-
f&£>22& 
RECORDED AT REQUEST OF 
,
^«^g^00UKIYRECOROER 
N O T I C E O F L I E N 
The undersigned STENTON W. WILCOX for STENTON W. WILCOX & ASSOCIATES 
hereby gives notice of intention to hold and claim a 
l ien upon the property and Improvements thereon owned and reputed to be owned by 
MATTHFW C. ft SHFpi M. MATTSON. h/w. J .J - and located In SALT LAKE County, 
Utah, more par t icu lar ly described as fol lows: 
OWNERS ADDRESS: 11848 South Buckwheat Way - Riverton, Utah 84065-4104 
PRUPLR1Y ADDRESS: 6642 South Stone Mi l l Drive - Sal t Lake C i ty , Utah 84121 
ALL OF LOT 641, MILL HOLLOW ESTATES - PLAT "F" SUBDIVISION 
(22-23-302-022) 
The amount demanded hereby is $3,488.25 + $100 Lien Fee + 1%%Int Per Month + Atty Fees 
owing to the undersigned for *furnishing materials used in ^ performing labor upon the 
construction *alterat1on *addit1on to *repair of a *bu1ld1ng *structure ^improvement 
upon the above described property. +STRIKE OUT UNNECESSARY WORDS 
The undersigned ^furnished said materials to *was employed by Matt Mattson 
, who was the purported owner/contractor , — 
such being done by the undersigned by the terms and con-ditions of which the undersigned did agree to furnish labor for the installation of 
interior tile systems. _ „ _ _ _ 
in consideration of payment to the undersigned therefore as follows: Progressive payments 
with payment in full upon completion of claimants work. 
and under which contract the first *material was furnished *labor was performed on the 
19th day of July , 19JJ3 and the last was so furnished or performed on the 
13th day of August i 19 93 and for all of which Materials *labor the undersigned 
became entitled to $3,488.25 , which 1s the reasonable value thereof, and on which 
payments have been made and credits and offsets allowed amounting to $ -0-
leaving a balance owing to the undersigned of $3,488.25 after deducting all just 
credits and offsets, and for which demand the undersigned holds and claims a lien.by 
virtue of the provisions of Chapter 1, Title 38, Utah Code Anrjptated, 1953, as Amended. 
DATED: 2 September 1993 ?^-^^^S^^<£^/^^2^ ^ 
STENTON W. WILCOX ft ASSOCIATFS 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
Stenton W. Wilcox 
ss. 
, being first duly sworn deposes and says that 
of Stenton W. Wilcox & Associates heXXKfc is the owner ,.. , ^__^ 
in the foregoing Notice of Lien; that he/KKtt has read and knows of"the contents thereof 
which are true as to hisXKKK own knowledge and belief; and that he/jfe* has appropriate 
authority to sign the foregoing Notice of Lien on behalf of the lien claimant, as its 
owner , KQCKXOCXKKXXCCXMKMKXXKXXKXItNXMNX and that he/Xfc* 
acknowledged to me that heX*K* executed the same. / s S 
Acknowledged, subscribed and sworn before me this 2nd, day 
of Septembpr 
WM. ISWILL JOHNSON I 
'446 Eft* 200 Sou* #5 I 
* *U*»C*y .U»h 84111 J 
Ito Oommfc*lon Expires I 
' Unwy 11.199) I 
^ • • i f » — — — — — — f c S 
4m<w&«<& 
Lsgtftd Vtt(X) • No(0) 
DEFENDANT' 
CXHlBITj 
EARNEST MONEY.SALES AGREEMENT 
IARNE8T MONEY MOIIPT 
The undersigned Buyer }JlMttK.'\S'Q']P^ f-^Ifl'Si'flft , J, fiO > hereby deposits with Broke! 
as EARNEST MONEY, the amount J 1 C/l ^Nllftria •tfffil(arAs V " 
_Ool(ar8($J^^2 
•try; 
ilch shall be depositeo in accordance with applicable State Law. •«• ? i - ; - ' " : t ' - " * j ^ " ~ v ; / ;> - -• «\ ••-•> -jt i ' \ t 
okerage ~ W j Phone Number ^ ^ * £ i - * < -',. A *~" ~" -w' v~" '"'••" 
7M 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
• 1 . PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MONEY Is given to. secure ^ and.appl/ on' the 'purchasetj?f the property situated ar 
subject to any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations, utility or other easements or righte of way% government* patents or i 
accordance with Section G, Said property is owned bv M(Hf U,(fH*>/)/) T ntiM/tV ^('tiffX** 
CHECK APPLICABLE BOXES?:^  
D UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY 
^IMPROVED RWL PROPERTY 
,-ihAK, 
state deeds of record approved by Buyer in 
sellers, and is more particularly described 
D Other.. 
(a) 
.P^Vacarrt L o t ^ D Vacant Acreage 
Q ^ r n m e r c i a l ^ f f Residential D^Condo ^ . 0 Other-, 
Included ItemscUniessTexcluded below, this* sale "snail Jnclude all fixtures^and -any^okthe I^tems shownjn.Section <A, if <presently, attached Jo\the property; 
The following persdrjalproperty shall also be included^ .this "sale and conveyed under separate^Bill-of»Sale with warrantiesasiertftter* . , - . „^. 
'H*'QQ(it-'nrw-rfv - .... . .-(b) Excluded Items^The following Items afeVpectfically'exc/udec/ from'-thisTaie:_ 
(c) CONNECTIONS, l.UYiLITIES«AND - OTHER s RIGHTS., Seller represents that the, propsrty i^ncludes ;,the- following ^ improvements. in the^purchase pricey 
E^ public sewer . ETconnected 
D septic tank. ED connected 
• other sanitary system 
0$ public water" ^connected 
D private water • connected 
D well D connected ^ . * D other 
• irrigation water / secondary system 
' # of shares "Company: 
D TV antenna T D master antenna^ tSfprewired' 
Qf natural gas * E connected 
.[^electricity* -:-i [^connected 
dftngress & egress by private ease'ment 
s t^ dedicated road . D paved. 
'ffcurb and gutter* 
! U other rights'. _ _ 
,o«_0^^-S w/ •P>. .prior to closing, D shall not be" furnished. (d) Survey. A certified Survey • shall be furnished at the expense ( 
(e) Buyer Inspection. feUyer has'made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section:1 (c) above and 6 below, accepts It in its present physical 
condition, except: .JL- ! i»S£i :f}ddjr\ni ISY\ )
 i _ .- _. 
2. PURCHASE PRICE AND RNANCING. The total purchase price for the proper^ I s ^ l i ^ W Wh^yVi^)SOi'\m\/L.. 
- T — - . ,
 : r , ; -. "Dollars (tl^Sls^ffXK > A ' j whteh shall b* pfl?H «c faii'^T 
which represents theaforedescribed^RNEST MONEY DEPOSIJ: J / / \ . ' ','"., . , ' v \ ^ . " : .**> 




representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed by buyer^  
which obligation bears interest a t _ 1 % per annum with monthly payments of $ 
which include:'^;D principal?^ _, 
^P^entfng'thV^proVimate^^^^^ additional existing mortgage; t r & s t ^ ^ to*bi 
*assujhed^BuyerV;wtiichj)bllgat^ 
which include:-i . U principal;^  U Interest; U taxes; . U Insurance;- • condo fees;-- D othei
 r _ . 
representing balance.Jf.any, Includina proceeds from, a newmortgage loah%- c^seller/financlngcto be paid as follows: -tt--Jn£xr 
Other-
TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE 
If Buyer is required to assume an underlying obligation (in which case Section F shall also'ap&iy) and/or.obtaln outside financing, Buyer agrees to use best efforts'; 
to assume and/or procure Same and this offer is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing. Buyer agrees' 
to make application within I . JV- { r\ '^days after Sellers'acceptance of this Agreement 'to^assiime'^ ho underlying obligation and/or obtain the new financing a! 
an interest rate not to exceecj 
. %" If Buyer does not qualify for the assumption ancVor financing within*. 
of this Agreement, this Agreement shall be voidable at the option of the Seller upon written notice, Seller agrees to pay up to 
points, not to exceed $—-,.. In addition, seller:agrees to pay $, • y % to be used for Buyer's other loan costs, 
days after Seller's acceptance:. 
. mortgage loan discount 
J&fe 
|& . CONDITION AND CONVEYANCE OF TTTUE^ Seller represents^m title to the property in fee simple D is purchasing the property under a real 
itafA ArtntrJJLTt Transfer rtf &AilAr*tt AumArchtrt lntAfAftt ehatl h A m a H a oe ea« lArtk^ln C A M ! A M C CAIIA >> «mrAA* «SN lnml^K A A M < anH marlrAtoHlA tttlA fn tho r\rs\r\Artvj •nk'iA*t 
£6. SELLERS W ARRANTIES. lniaddition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted: 
Sot nAdiMnm]2M,M^^-*•'- ' • - ' g
-yptk>ns to>hA ahova and Section C snail hA*limita^tn W f n l l n w l n g ^ ' ^ - ^ » " ^ ^ - ^ 
*t SPECtALCONSIDERATIONS ANDCO^NGENqES^ 
^ - t tn closings / ^ ^ T j / V : / v . y A 
v «'5**f,'*?-***^'**s: 
offer is made subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which must be satisfied 
<^ » v . .•• . ^iv.H'f*; t>^»'»T«^ ^ T *rf^ r* -t** »<4; * * ^ ^ t - f^ ' * 
; &K'-.«d.]eS'K«:.^>K7>]& C -^ i^Uhf f.*-r'U*rfW;4>iqfCR!}S-.** f f U * A o 4 fcJ-t ,HO(Kt i . ^ H ^ A * ^ = . * J O I *r *• .» I ^ ^ v . ; ti> -£«*«V •**-• i r > • ^'::«,vrJi- • •: i?- '** t'v i-.i<)C 
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A Again I don't recall seeing this cost breakdown. I 
really don't. Doesn't mean that I didn't, but I don't recall 
it. 
Q Look at Exhibit 10 and 11. 
A Okay. 
Q What do those represent? 
A Again, trust deed note is a promise to pay us back 
monies that we are going to lend. 
THE COURT: We already know that, don't we, 
Counsel? 
MR. BRAUNBERGER: Yeah. Sorry, your Honor. 
Q (By Mr. Braunberger) Do you have any recollection 
concerning what the nature of the agreement was between 
Promax and Mattsons concerning building the Mattson home? 
A Vaguely, just vaguely, but I can tell you what I do 
remember is that the home was to be built on a cost-plus is 
what I feel was presented to us because it was going to be in 
a show or a Parade of Homes, we were able to get a special 
loan origination fee because of the advertisement part, that 
we all knew from day one that there would be probably extras 
and that we had to establish, because of deadlines, a price 
and if in fact those things would go over, then it certainly 
would be the responsibility again from other transactions 
that we have gone through of the responsibility of the indi-
vidual or increase the loan balance on the long term in order 
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to cover it. That's basically what I remember. 
Q Okay. Do you remember whether Mattsons brought 
money in during the course of the loan to supplement the 
amounts? 
A I don't remember that. 
Q Mr. Barraclough, let me show you what's been marked 
as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 42 and have you identify that, if 
you can. 
A It looks like a computer generated statement. It 
would be probably from Far West Bank as far as disbursements 
on the account. 
MR. SMITH: Judge, we object to this. We have 
never seen this. 
THE COURT: Well, whether or not you've seen it, 
the witness is not testifying as to what it is. He's saying 
what it may well be, so there's no foundation so far yet for 
it to be offered. 
MR. SMITH: All right. We had written a letter to 
Counsel asking for everything he intended to use. 
THE COURT: Well, I'll hear you when it's offered. 
So far it hasn't been offered. 
Q (By Mr. Braunberger) Do you know whether or not 
that's from Far West Bank? 
A It appears to match their format. 
Q Do any of the numbers match up with this particular 
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A Did I forget what? 
Q That he said that to you? 
A Again it didn't strike me as a serious note because 
I didn't think it had anything to do with me. 
Q So he told you that he was in a lawsuit with Phil 
Bates, asked you a question about cost. You said it was a 
set fee? 
A I don't think I said set fee. 
Q It seems to me that we went in for a certain dollar 
figure. 
A Okay. That's for the loan amount. 
Q Okay. 
A Okay. Now, back up and look at the cost-plus, 
okay, there's a big difference there and if you're talking 
about terminology here, let's define some terminology first. 
Q Okay. We all know that the loan amount was for a 
set fee. 
A And that's what I was thinking in terms of — 
Q Let me read this to you and you can tell me if this 
is correct then. 
Matt, this is Matt speaking. "Yeah, see, we went 
in for the 190,000 'cause he says this is what it's going to 
cost. 
"Mark. Uh-huh." 
A Okay. What does that mean? Uh-huh. Am I agreeing 
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1 enough that there were yes and no's on a lot of this stuff. 
2 Q Does this one look familiar? 
3 A It does, 
4 Q On this form does it not say construction contract? 
5 Is that not one of the categories? 
6 A It says that on the form, yes. 
7 Q And does REQ stand for required? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q And does REC stand for received? 
10 A Right. 
11 Q Why would both these be checked? 
12 A Because apparently it was in the file. 
13 Q Okay, so there would have been a construction 
14 contract? 
15 A Again getting back to definitions, a construction 
16 contract can be a cost breakdown. 
17 Q Well, I understand that. 
18 A Okay. 
19 Q Typically the cost breakdown is the contract, 
20 correct? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q And careful builders are clear typically to say 
23 that it is a cost-plus when it's a cost-plus, and that is 
24 typically in the papers, correct? 
25 A I disagree. With the people that I work with, that 
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is not a normal way of doing business. 
Q It's your experience that they're left open? 
A Pretty much. 
Q And those open-ended contracts don't say cost-plus? 
A I assume probably in my 18 years of cost-plus con-
tracts, maybe a half a dozen at most. 
Q Half a dozen? That's it? 
A Yeah. 
Q Okay, and out of those half a dozen, don't those 
typically say that they're cost-plus? 
A Yes. 
MR. SMITH: Thank you. Your Honor, we would move 
to admit this as Exhibit 1. I apologize. We had no idea 
this was going to be an issue. 
THE COURT: It won't be Exhibit 1. It will be 43. 
Is there any objection to this document, 
Mr. Braunberger? 
MR. BRAUNBERGER: No objection. 
THE COURT: Very well. It's received. 
Q (By Mr. Smith) Now, getting back to the plans in 
front of you, do you have any experience in looking at plans? 
A Very little. 
Q Okay. Do you have enough so that you could recog-
nize a bedroom or a bathroom? 
A Oh, absolutely. 
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1 of Homes, correct? 
2 A Correct. 
3 Q And wasn't it your representation to Matt Mattson 
4 that about a hundred thousand people come through the Parade 
5 of Homes? 
6 A I may have said that, yes. 
7 Q And that's why builders are so eager to give dis-
8 counts and so forth to advertise their talents and their 
9 materials? 
10 A Builders and suppliers, yes. 
11 Q And these discounts are only given for the Parade 
12 of Homes, correct? 
13 A Discounts were given, yes. 
14 Q Yes, and Matt Mattson received — I'm just using 
15 the number loosely, I think it was something like $10,000 of 
16 free counter tops for the Parade of Homes from one of your 
17 suppliers. Is it your opinion that he would not have 
18 received that if he were not in the Parade of Homes? 
19 A Correct. 
20 Q He would have paid what, retail? 
21 A I believe. 
22 Q Okay, and isn't it true that in your experience the 
23 only time, especially in times right now where the construe-
24 tion business is pretty busy, the only discounts people get 
25 are those in the Parade of Homes, correct? 
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THE COURT: You may. 
MR. SMITH: To save the Court some time, we're 
going to give Counsel the liens and then if he deems they 
were filed consecutively, then we'll just stipulate. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Q (By Mr. Smith) Now, it was your testimony that 
there was nothing in writing from the prospective buyer to 
Matt Mattson's home for the price of $560,000; wasn't that 
your testimony? 
A That we had in offer in writing? 
Q That there was not an offer in writing. 
MR. BRAUNBERGER: Your Honor, I think that mischar-
acterized the testimony. I think he testified he didn't see 
anything in writing. 
Q (By Mr. Smith) Okay. Did you see this — what 
appears to be a contract for the sale of a home for $565,000 
by a company that you are affiliated with, broker? 
A I have seen it after the sale did not go through. 
Q Okay. Do you have any idea why the sale did not go 
through? 
A House wasn't sold. 
Q Do you know why the house didn't sell? 
A I believe there's a dispute between — not the 
house itself, but a dispute on amounts of the furniture that 
was included in this contract is why it didn't sell. 
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1 Q Okay, so you wouldn't know if this particular buyer 
2 said — did this particular buyer say to you personally, "I 
3 can't buy this house because there suddenly popped up six 
4 liens and I'm not going to buy a lawsuit"? 
5 A No. 
6 Q So other than the dispute you wanted to be the 
7 salesman, the real estate agent on this deal. Typically 
8 don't real estate agents investigate why buyers suddenly get 
9 cold feet? 
10 A Well, I did not have a listing agreement. I backed 
11 off of the deal when Matt refused to sign a listing agreement 
12 as the time that another agent was going to submit the papers 
13 to Matt. 
14 Q Do you know a Laurie Gale? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q Did you ever say to Laurie Gale, "This deal's not 
17 going to close because I burned it by liening it, liening the 
18 property"? 
19 A Not in those words, no. 
20 Q What words? 
21 A I — Laurie and her husband Marty Gale were 
22 involved in a situation with liens on a home and I probably 
23 — and I did represent that there were liens on this home. 
24 Q How did you know there had been liens? 
25 A I dealt with the subcontractors. 
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and then it was just kind of filled in in pencil there. Why 
was that? Why was it done that way? Can you tell the Judge? 
A No, idea. 
MR. BRAUNBERGER: We have no objection to the 
admission of that. 
THE COURT: All right, 55's received. 
Q (By Mr. Smith) Okay. In the exhibits that your 
attorney presented, Exhibit 9, this is the exhibit that 
you're claiming was the guideline, correct? 
A This was the exhibit that was submitted to the bank 
for the $190,200 amount. 
Q Now, in your deposition you testified that the bank 
— in fact, please tell the Judge what it was the bank said 
to you or how it was that you understood that you were to 
come up with a $190,200 figure. 
A That was the number I was directed to for the 
amount of the construction loan. 
Q And who directed you to come to that number? 
A Probably, I believe, Mark Barraclough and Matt 
Mattson. 
Q Okay. Now, you heard Mark Barraclough's testimony 
that he wouldn't direct somebody to come up with certain 
figures. Can you reconcile the two testimonies for me so I 
can understand if there appears to be an apparent conflict? 
Can you explain to me how the two justify? 
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1 A We did have a supplier give the alarm system for 
2 free, yes, 
3 Q Okay, and that was about a $4500 savings to 
4 Mr. Mattson, correct? 
5 A I disagree with — I don't know what the amount is. 
6 Q Okay, and wasn't it true that an — on Exhibit 
7 No. 9 you have $4,500 written down as budgeted for stucco. 
8 Is it true that he was to get the stucco free but he was to 
9 pay for labor? 
10 A No. 
11 Q Okay, and now on this exhibit that your attorney 
12 gave me it shows here that you ended up paying $10,000 plus 
13 an extra $1100 for the stucco which was $6,600 more than 
14 Exhibit 9. Would you like me to show you that? 
15 A Yes, please. 
16 Q Okay. Where it says stucco — you see how you have 
17 $4500 budgeted and then at the end it ends up being $11,000? 
18 A That's what it shows. Again this budget amount 
19 didn't even reflect the house we ended up with. 
20 Q Okay, but again, so you're off like $6600. Did you 
21 ever tell Matt that the stucco was going to be more than 
22 initially budgeted? 
23 A You bet. 
24 Q Okay, and the initial painting contract allows for 







Didn't he receive a lot of the roofing materials 
I believe he got some discounts. I don't know 
exactly how much. 







If that's what it shows, correct. 
THE COURT: What item is that again, Counsel? 
MR. SMITH: Roofing and the roofers. 
THE COURT: Where's that? On page 1 or 2? 
THE WITNESS: Page 1. 
(By Mr. Smith) And your brother is the roofer, 
My brother did install the roofing, yes. 







THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, back on that point 
roofing, there was $1500 budgeted, but what was 
MR. SMITH: The amount budgeted was $1,500. 
THE COURT: I see that. 
MR. SMITH: He paid $3,939, so he paid $2,439.23 
2,439 too much. 
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A For counter tops? 
Q Yes. 
A I have no idea. Matt cut his own deal on that as 
well as the cabinets and I don't know what he paid. 
Q Matt cut his own deal on the counter tops? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q Okay, but you would agree that there was $3800 more 
paid than the zero or the dash that was on Exhibit 9? 
A If it's through the construction loan, if it was 
disbursed through the construction loan under Matt's 
direction. 
Q Okay. All right. I'm working off your numbers 
here. 
A But I have no idea what Matt did. 
Q Didn't you tell Matt that he was supposed to 
receive the plumbing fixtures in the master bedroom free? 
A I told Matt and we did, I believe, get some dis-
counts on plumbing. 
Q Was it supposed to be completely free? 
A The plumbing in the master bedroom? 
Q The fixtures, plumbing fixtures. 
A We can look at the plumber's bill and see if they 
were. I don't believe I told Matt that they were for free. 
Q Well, he got them free. 
A Good. 
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THE COURT: Should we amend the Complaint? 
MR. SMITH: No. I'm simply making a point that 
there were some things that Matt got free. 
THE COURT: There is a risk, you know, of estab-
lishing that your client got something that he should have 
paid for that he didn't. 
MR. SMITH: Sure, but it was — 
THE COURT: I understand. I'm just making an 
observation, Mr. Smith. 
MR. SMITH: Thank you, Judge. 
Q (By Mr. Smith) And wasn't he supposed to receive 
half of the rest of the fixtures throughout the house — 
well, the rest of the fixtures throughout the house, wasn't 
he to get those from a supplier for half price? 
A He did get substantial discounts through several 
items. We have the plumber's invoice and many of them do 
show discounts. Matt was involved in that decision as well 
He even picked them out. 
Q Okay, so it would not be your estimation that he 
paid $2,000 more than he should have? 
A Should have — he should have from what? I mean, 
from this line item cost right here? 
Q Right. 
A If he paid $2,000 more, it's noted through the 
construction breakdown, yes. 
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Q On soffit and fascia, on number two, Exhibit 9, you 
have written down $2,500 — excuse me. I believe you have 
$2500 was to be paid for soffit and fascia, correct? 
A That's what the line item shows, yes. 
Q Okay, and Matt paid 5,000, correct? 
A If that's what it shows, correct. That was — in 
the soffit and fascia, we got another substantial discount. 
We got a crown type material and keyed out for a recessed 
cans that Matt added in and Matt was involved in that, too, 
yes. 
Q Did you have a change order for that? 
A Again there's — there was nothing to change order 
from. 
Q Okay. In fact — but in fact, you have no change 
orders, correct? 
A Correct. 
Q All right, and — but when the dust settled, Matt 
paid $2,227 too much off the budgeted price in Exhibit 9 for 
his soffits and fascia, correct? 
A If that's how you look at it. 
Q Okay. 
A I don't. 
Q Did you not tell Matt he would be getting his 
carpet for half price? 
A Matt cut his own deal on his carpet. I had no 
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1 input. 
2 Q Well, didn't Matt cut his own deal on his carpet 
3 because when he asked you about the half price deal, you said 
4 it never existed? 
5 A Not true. 
6 Q Okay. Well, wasn't there $6,000 budgeted — or 
7 excuse me. There was $4500 budgeted for carpet, correct? 
8 A Flooring, $6,000 on this list. 
9 Q Sure, but that wasn't all carpet, was it? 
10 A Anything that goes — any floor coverings. 
11 Q Okay. Was Matt supposed to receive his brick for 
12 half price? 
13 A I'm not sure but Matt did get discounts from the 
14 brick. I believe Matt counted every individual brick and 
15 only wanted to pay for every exact brick that he had on his 
16 house and I did give him a credit on some brick. 
17 Q Okay. Heating and air-conditioning you have budg-
18 eted for $5,200, correct? 
19 A Correct. That's what we have in there. 
20 Q And Matt ended up paying $7,660, or $2,460 beyond 
21 I that, correct? 
What did he pay? Seven what? 
$7,760. 
All right. 
Which is 2460 above that. 
22 THE COURT 
23 MR. SMITH 
24 THE COURT 
25 MR. SMITH 
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1 Q Okay. Excuse me. I wasn't trying to be sarcastic 
2 there. 
3 Why would you just put in an amount if the home was 
4 worth $560,000? What if it burned down? 
5 A As we — Promax insures the home, what's normally 
6 standard is we just put in the amount of the construction 
7 loan or in progress as we do progress, we step up the insured 
8 amount until we're complete and then it closes, so the amount 
9 of the insurance related to the construction loan is stepped 
10 up in stages. 
11 Q The home was completed what, August 15th 
12 approximately? 
13 A I believe it was about that time, yes. 
14 Q And at that time you were declaring the value of 
15 the home at $165,000. The loan was $190,200. I guess part 
16 of that was for the lot and lots don't burn down. Is that 
17 the 165 figure instead of 190? 
18 A I think if we look at the construction cost break-
19 down, their disbursements, that reflects to about the amount 
20 of the disbursements of the loan at that time. 
21 Q Okay, and the amount of money it took to insure a 
22 $165,000 home was roughly 46 bucks, wasn't it? 
23 A We have statements to verify that amount. 
24 Q Okay, and to insure it for double that amount would 
25 have been only an extra 50 bucks, correct? 
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completed. It was stepped up. That's what I'm assuming 
there. 
Q Well, when the home was finished, wasn't the market 
value of the home $450,000? 
A We, I believe, had an offer for five — what do you 
show — 565? 
Q Five sixty-five. 
A What somebody's willing to pay us, that would be 
what it's worth. That 330,000 is probably a number that Matt 
and I decided to insure the property for and you're right, 
that excludes the lot and maybe whatever else, landscaping, 
I'm not sure, but the home was insured while it was under 
construction loan. 
Q But do you have any other document that shows any-
thing before this August 20th — well, never mind. 
One other question for you. On the insurance 
things that you were submitting, when you were submitting the 
$165,000 value, isn't that in an column that says total esti-
mated completed value? 
A The column of — 
Q Well, when you insured it in June and July, July 
27th, when you insured it for $165,000, the column says total 
estimated completed value. 
A Okay. 
Q Why didn't you give the total estimated completed 
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A Business management, human behavior, child 
development. 
Q Have you previous to the experience you had with 
Mr. Bates, had you ever been involved in the bidding or 
pricing or building of a home? 
A Never. 
Q How did you come into contact with Mr. Bates? 
A I think in probably '88 or '89 he and his two 
brothers built a furniture store for us so — 
Q Okay, and how did you come in contact with him 
about building your home? 
A We had — there was actually a lawsuit that his 
brothers were trying to evict us out of our building. R. C, 
Willey's had come in and offered double what we paid on a 
lease to try to get us out. They upped the lease — 
MR. BRAUNBERGER: Your Honor, I don't know how 
that's relevant. 
THE WITNESS: Well, give me — 
THE COURT: I don't either, Counsel. 
Q (By Mr. Smith) All right. Just really quickly, 
that was the lawsuit that you won, correct? 
A Correct, yes. 
Q In fact, that was the lawsuit in which Pat Brian 
censured the other side pretty heavily. 
A That's right. 
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you can get great discounts off of it." He had told me about 
his partner, Coley Davis, how they had built this home. They 
had showed me an article, actually posted this home at 1.1 
million dollars. I was told that the home was built around 
six hundred and fifty, $600,000, and that I could get these 
same types of savings off of it. 
I met with his partner Coley, actually gone through 
this home during the Parade of Homes, and they just showed me 
all these wonderful things, got me excited about it. "You 
can buy this home for, you know, virtually almost half 
price." 
Q So you agreed to go with Phil as the builder? 
A Yeah, he showed us the area and we actually weren't 
too excited about the area to build a home, but we were 
looking — 
THE COURT: Just a minute. We're getting into this 
need to volunteer information. I want you to listen to the 
question and answer the question only. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead, Mr. Smith. 
Q (By Mr. Smith) Okay. Did you apply for a 
construction loan with Far West Bank? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. How much of a loan did you apply for? 




































Why that amount? 
Because that's what Phil told me the home would 
Okay. Now, was there anything that you and Phil 
arrive at that cost? 
I don't want to — 
Well, just briefly. Did you look at any other 
Yes, we did. We looked at actually this home right 
here that he submitted as being my plans. I never have seen 
these plans, but I've been to those peoples' homes. 
Q Did you go to those homes with Phil? 
A Yes, we did, and he had a model home that was also 
similar to this. We went through, I think probably five or 
six homes. 
Q Did you tell Phil what you wanted from your home? 
A I did, yes. 
Q Okay. Now, you've looked at Exhibit 12, the second 
set of plans. 
A Correct. 
Q Do those plans comply with the home that was built 
for you? 
A Yes. 
Q How much, if any, did Phil Bates tell you that that 
home, that home, Exhibit 12, would cost completed? 
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questions and pay close attention to what I'm asking. 
A This was the conversation. The conversation was 
what happened. "Did I get cut out of the deal?" 
And I said, "Phil, you were not in the deal. Your 
brokers came to me and had said — " This was the conversa-
tion, not the observation. The conversation was that they 
came to me and said that they had — that there was a poten-
tial that they would be used because you represented to them 
that you had the listing on my home when in fact you did not 
and they said please sign this deal and obviously, I wanted 
to sell the home. 
Q How did he respond? 
A He said, "That's it. I'm killing your deal. 
You're dead." 
And I said, "Well, you know, you do what you have 
to do," and at this point I had no idea what he had meant by 
that. 
Q You did not know how or if he would kill it? 
A No, I didn't. 
Q Okay. Then what happened during the next couple of 
days that you observed? 
A The very next day I received phone calls from a 
Mr. Layton, from Randy Bathemess, from Farrell Workman, and 
from Frank — I think his last name is Richards from Marble 

































contacted them and said — 
MR. BRAUNBERGER: Object, that's hearsay. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
(By Mr. Smith) Remember, I'm asking you what you 
Was it brought to your attention that you had been 
Yes. 
Okay. Was it brought to your attention how many 
people liened you? 
A Yes, I had six people lien me, four that day and 
two the very next day, four on the first and two on the 
second. 
Q Okay. Did Phil Bates ever admit to you that he was 
the one who — 
A Yes, he did. 
Q — put this all together? 
Will you please tell Judge Frederick what he said 
to you concerning this? 
A I talked with Phil and, of course, I was furious at 
this and Phil, and I said, "I c&n't believe you did that, you 
know, that was completely low budget." I said, "These people 
were owed no money at this time." 
Q Let me interject one thing here. Had any invoices 
for this work of any of these people who liened you, had any 
invoices by them been submitted to you? 
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1 A I had not received one invoice from one of these 
2 people at that time. 
3 Q As far as you know, had any demand upon you been 
4 made? 
5 A No, not to me. If they had from Phil, I was not 
6 aware of it. 
7 Q Okay. Have you received any documentation from 
8 Phil of any invoice or anything showing a demand? 
9 A At this point, no, I had not. 
10 Q Please tell Judge Frederick then after you had said 
11 this to Phil, what he said to you. 
12 A "I told you if you don't pay me the commission, I'd 
13 kill your deal." 
14 I said, "Well, looks like you did it." 
15 That same day — 
16 THE COURT: You've answered the question. 
17 THE WITNESS: Sure. 
18 Q (By Mr. Smith) Did he admit he killed the deal? 
19 A He did. He told me he killed the deal. 
20 Q And I didn't get the exact verbiage of how he 
21 admitted he killed it. 
22 A He said, "I told you I would kill the deal." 
23 And I said, "You had those people lien me," and I 
24 said, "Phil, I don't even know these people. These people 
25 haven't completed their work. They haven't even billed me." 
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And he said, "Well, I told you to pay me the 
commission." 
Q Now, had Phil Bates made a demand upon you or did 
Phil Bates lien you for $10,000 owed to him? 
A Phil Bates was not owed and he did not lien me, no. 
Q When was it that — this December 2nd letter that 
has this penciled amount of 10,000 that you saw, did you see 
anything before then of a demand for $10,000 by Phil Bates? 
A No, no, he never asked me for any money. 
Q Okay, and in fact, didn't he indicate to you that 
he had made a substantial amount of money off of Scott 
Stowers who was doing plumbing work? 
A Absolutely, yes. 
Q And that much of the monies owed to him had come 
out of that? 
A Yes. 
Q And did you not also make a payment to him of 
$2,000 on top of that? 
A Correct. 
Q And did you not give him a lien waiver for payment 
in full for all his fees? 
A Yes, we did. 
Q I'll show the Court that in a moment. We'll come 
back to that. 
Will you please turn to Exhibit 9? This is the one 
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happen to you if you did not go through the Parade of Homes? 
A In fact, he did because at the time when we had the 
problem with the paint, I had said, "Look, this is it. I'm 
pulling out. We're not going to do this because I can't 
afford this." 
Q How much was budgeted for the paint? 
A $4,000. 
Q And when the painting job came around, how much did 
Phil tell you it was going to be? 
A $14,000. He said he made a mistake of $10,000. I 
said, "You know, you're paying for this." 
And he says, "I can't afford to eat it." 
I said, "I can't afford to eat it. This is what 
the agreement was." 
Q Did he acknowledge that he made a mistake? 
A He did, yes. 
Q Okay, and if you had pulled out of the Parade of 
Homes, what, if anything, would have happened to you? 
A According to Phil, what he had told me is that the 
contractors that had given us these discounts would then sue 
me for the full amount because they would not have exposure 
that they had contracted with him for. 
Q And your understanding would be that would add how 
much cost to your home? 
A Forty percent more. 
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1 these items? 
2 A I believe the items — 
3 MR. BRAUNBERGER: Object, it's opinion. No 
4 foundation. 
5 MR. SMITH: Your Honor, I believe this is in the 
6 ordinary knowledge of a person. I'm trying to save a lot of 
7 time here. 
8 THE COURT: The witness is the owner and I'm of the 
9 view that he can testify as to what his anticipated loss of 
10 costs of repairs would be. 
11 Q (By Mr. Smith) Have you talked to any contractors? 
12 A Yes, I have. In fact, a number of them. 
13 THE COURT: What is your estimated cost of repair? 
14 THE WITNESS: We have bids for $23,000, I believe, 
15 and change. 
16 MR. SMITH: Okay. Judge, if you would like, I 
17 could submit those bids to you. If you just want to take his 
18 testimony, I will move on. 
19 THE COURT: Well, as I've indicated, as a legal 
20 matter, he's entitled as the owner of the property to testify 
21 as to what his loss is or his cost of repair is. 
22 Q (By Mr. Smith) Did you notify Mr. Bates about 
23 these defects? 
24 A Yes, I did. 
25 Q Did you send him a fax? 
220 
A A o f* r* rj 
1 testify to that. 
2 THE COURT: Well, I think he's now indicated that 
3 that's what he was told, so the objection is sustained. 
4 MR. SMITH: Thank you, Judge. 
5 Q (By Mr. Smith) Have you done any research on your 
6 own to determine what the value of your home is today? 
7 A Yeah. 
8 Q And what is that determination? 
9 A I believe it's about 420. 
10 MR. BRAUNBERGER: Object if he's testifying as to 
11 what somebody told him. 
12 THE COURT: Well, that's correct. The man can 
13 testify as to the value of his own property. We don't need, 
14 however, to emphasize that by showing that it's based upon 
15 hearsay. He has an opinion. It can be based on a variety of 
16 factors. As the owner, he can tell us what his opinion as to 
17 the value is. 
18 MR. SMITH: Thank you, Judge, and I asked him for 
19 research. I was not asking for comments by realtors. 
20 Q (By Mr. Smith) And what is your estimation of the 
21 value of the home? 
22 A Four hundred to four hundred and twenty. 
23 Q Okay, and at the time the sale did not go through? 
24 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
25 Q When you received the $565,000 offer, what was your 
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Do you think 








there's any way 
I'm just going to show you a 
The first is 
you could 
couple of 
get ! 565 for 
things 
— did Mr. Bates ever tell you 
value a lien waiver had? 
It makes it so that people supposedly can't 
what, 
lien 
you anymore is what he told me, 
MR. BRAUNBERGER: That's nonresponsive to the 
question. 
THE WITNESS: He told me that people can't lien you 
after they send a lien waiver. 
THE COURT: I'll allow that to stand. 
Q (By Mr. Smith) Okay. Will you please tell the 
Judge who those lien waivers are from? 
A They are from Dillman Electric, Phil Bates and 
General Plumbing Contractors and Phil Bates. 
Q Okay. Now, was any work done on your — now, these 
are dated the 25th of October of '93. This is after your 
home was built, correct? 
A Yes, it was. 
THE COURT: Is this an exhibit? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, Judge. 
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A Probably, yeah. 
Q That home doesn't have an indoor pool, does it? 
A It does not as far as I know. I didn't see one. 
Q The basement in that home was not finished, was it? 
A I actually didn't go in the basement, so I don't 
know. 
Q Your home has a completely finished basement, 
doesn't it? 
A Sixty percent finished. 
Q Did you consider the basement as including the pool 
area? 
A Yeah, uh-huh. Well, actually, there's other areas 
in the basement that are not finished, as well. 
Q Now, I guess the question goes to there's a pool 
area, then there's another area that's part of the basement 
that's not part of the pool area, correct? 
A Correct. 
Q Is it 60 percent of the pool area plus that other 
area that's unfinished? 
A Probably — I don't know even the square feet. 
Probably I'd say it's probably within that realm, yeah. 
Q Isn't it true that you negotiated the contract with 
Mermaid Pools directly? 
A Both Phil and I actually — I'm sorry. 
Q And that you signed the contract with Mermaid 
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1 Pools? 
2 I A Both Phil and I talked with them, but I signed it 
3 because he didn't have the credit. They wouldn't accept him. 
4 Q And you worked directly with Mermaid Pools? 
5 A We both did. He actually worked with plumbing and 
6 the excavation and laying all the plumbing work but, yeah, 
7 talking with him about having that — 
8 THE COURT: No. Just a minute. You're rambling 
9 again. 
10 THE WITNESS: Okay. 
11 THE COURT: The question was fairly specific. 
12 State it again. 
13 Q (By Mr. Braunberger) You worked directly with 
14 Mermaid Pools? 
15 A On some things, yes. 
16 Q On the pool itself? 
17 A In addition to others, yes, I did work with them. 
18 Q Let me show you what's been marked as Plaintiff's 
19 Exhibit No. 63. Is that your signature that appears in the 
20 lower right-hand corner? 
21 A It is, yes. 
22 Q And that's the contract between you and Mermaid 
23 Pools for the pool, isn't it? 
24 A Correct, yes. 
25 Q And you asked that — you had a discussion with 
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Q Did you ever seek any written documentation? 
A This was good enough. I thought this was. 
THE COURT: No. The question is, did you seek any? 
THE WITNESS: Oh, I'm sorry. No, I did not, other 
than this, no. 
Q (By Mr. Braunberger) Did Jim Beech ever advise you 
to get it in writing? 
A No, he just said, "Watch your costs." 
Q Isn't it true that that cost breakdown was provided 
to the bank so you could obtain the construction loan? 
THE COURT: I didn't hear you. Maybe the witness 
did. You've got to keep your voice up. 
MR. BRAUNBERGER: I'm sorry about it. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Q (By Mr. Braunberger) Isn't it true that that cost 
breakdown was provided to the bank only so you could obtain a 
construction loan? 
A I have no idea why he submitted it to the bank, but 
that could be for his reasons. As far as I know, this was 
what the home was supposed to be. 
THE COURT: If you don't know the answer, say you 
don't know the answer. 
THE WITNESS: I don't know why he submitted it, 
yeah. 



















it true that during the 


















A Yes and no. 
Q Okay. 
A I didn't deal with his painter, no. 
Q Okay. You negotiated the counter tops? 
A Yes and no. 
Q You negotiated the cabinets? 
A Yes and no. 
Q And you dealt with the framers? 
A No, I mean, other than, "How you doing?" 
THE COURT: Oh. 
THE WITNESS: I mean ^-
THE COURT: You know, all of us here recognize, 
sir, that the examination is not relating to daily greetings. 
Did you deal with them in terms of negotiating what they were 
to do and what they were to be paid for? 










Mr. Braunberger) Isn't it true that you speci-
location for tile work? 





chose the type of quality of the tile? 
COURT: Of course. 
WITNESS: Yeah. 
COURT: Certainly. That's just what we 
cussed, wasn't it, Counsel, a minute ago? 
MR. 
dis-
BRAUNBERGER: Your Honor, what we're showing 






COURT: I'm sure he is around a lot of the 
distinction here that needs to be made to 
least, if that's what you're seeking to do, is 
what he was actually doing in the way of functioning as a de 
facto contractor as opposed to simply maybe an overly 











Mr. Braunberger) Okay. You contracted 
Marble Glass, correct? 
We both talked with him, but yeah, I did. 
And what did they provide? 
They provided the cabinets for the house. 
Relating to the sale to Curtis Johnson, did 
the 
Yes 





1 at that time. 
2 THE COURT: Well, now we're examining him about it, 
3 so I presume you agree it ought to be received. 
4 MR. BRAUNBERGER: Yeah. 
5 THE COURT: So 54 is now received, so having 
6 received it, I'd like to see it when you're through with it, 
7 Mr. Braunberger. 
8 MR. BRAUNBERGER: Sure. 
9 Q (By Mr. Braunberger) Do you have any addendums to 
10 that Earnest Money Agreement or counter offers? 
11 A I don't know if there are any there — or you mean 
12 in addition to that? 
13 Q Yes. 
14 A I think that there were because he'd offered origi-
15 nally 565. I'm sorry. 
16 THE COURT: The question is, do you have anything 
17 beyond what is here? 
18 THE WITNESS: I don't think so, no, I don't believe 
19 so. 
20 THE COURT: All right. 
21 Q (By Mr. Braunberger) Was there a signed addendum 
22 where you agreed to things? 
23 A There may have been so — 
24 Q What was the final agreement? You'd sell for a 
25 hundred and fifty thousand? 
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1 A Five hundred and fifty, 
2 Q Five hundred and fifty thousand without furniture? 
3 A Correct, yeah, that was the difference. 
4 MR. BRAUNBERGER: Your Honor, may I see that 
5 exhibit? 
6 THE COURT: Yes, you may. 
7 Q (By Mr. Braunberger) I show you paragraph no. 1 
8 where it lists Matt Mattson and Promax as sellers. 
9 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
10 Q Can you explain that? 
11 A Yeah. Actually Phil Bates tried to sell my home to 
12 this Mr. Johnson, somehow claiming it was his home. He'd 
13 actually stipulated on page 3 that he was the — representing 
14 that he had a written agreement to sell the home, so I did 
15 not fill any of this in at all. 
16 Q Is that cleared up in subsequent documents you 
17 don't have with you today? 
18 A It may have been. It probably was. In fact, in 
19 fact, I thought they had scratched it out so — 
20 Q Isn't it true that after that sale didn't go 
21 through, you made no effort to list your home? 
22 A Well, yes. 
23 Q Since that sale went through, you've made no effort 
24 to sell your home? 
25 A Actually, we have attempted to, yeah. 
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your line of questioning here is an attempt to establish that 
Horsley may not have been credible because of some relation-
ship he has with this witness, then, you see, that puts me at 
a difficult posture. I have accepted the proffer on the 
basis of when it was given me without regard to issues of 
credibility and bias, so further examination about any busi-
ness connection, et cetera, that this witness may have with 
Horsley is not helpful to me. 
All right. 
MR. SMITH: Thank you, Judge. 
Q (By Mr. Braunberger) Would you agree with me that 
your home has approximately 7,113 square feet? 
A I really don't know, to be quite honest with you. 
Q So you have nothing that would dispute Mr. Bates's 
testimony on that matter? 
A No. I believe it's less, but I don't have 
anything. 
Q Isn't it true that Phil was not involved on — in 
the lawsuit that you had with his brothers except as a 
witness? 
MR. SMITH: Objection, Judge. 
THE COURT: I'm not sure that that's going to help 
me, Mr. Braunberger. Quite frankly, what has gone on before 
in the lives of these folks I consider to be essentially 
irrelevant anyway. I'm concerned about the dispute they have 
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1 MR. BRAUNBERGER: It goes to credibility. 
2 Q (By Mr. Braunberger) Let's look at page 93 of the 
3 deposition, beginning on line 6. That says, "You had to 
4 borrow 75, 70,000 on your credit cards to pay sub-
5 contractors?" 
6 A "Yes." 
7 Q "And you're saying that you had to pay $150,000 
8 more than what you allege the contract amount to be?" 
9 A "About 140 I think." 
10 I Q "Where did the other 60, 70,000 come from?" 
11 A "I had a hundred and twenty-seven thousand in my 
12 bank account. I kept — I keep a lot of cash or a lot of 
13 money. I try to have all my debts paid off and I sucked all 
14 that money out and dumped it into the loan." 
15 Q Why didn't use the whole 127,000 cash that you had 
16 instead of running up credit cards?" 
17 A Because I have actually a couple of funds which are 
18 — I have — I did not really want to bring this up, but I 
19 have a missionary fund as well as I have a college fund for 
20 I our children and I have a bank account, so we depleted — and 
21 all this is in the bank and we depleted the money out of my 
22 bank account and out of the college fund. We kept intact our 
23 mission fund." 
24 Q Earlier you testified that Promax made money off of 
25 Scott Stowers. 
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1 talked in their master bedroom. 
2 Q Tell me what was said during that conversation. 
3 A While we were talking about that, Matt was building 
4 a TV system installed in the ceiling over his bedroom, as I 
5 recall. 
6
 THE COURT: I think the question, sir, was, what 
7 was said and by whom. 
8
 THE WITNESS: Oh. We were just talking about the 
9 various things that he was doing for upgrades and Matt 
mentioned to me, he said, you know, talking about all the 
11 deals that come along and I says, "Oh, yeah," I says, "I went 
12 over $200,000 over my project." 
13 And he said — he showed me a sauna system that was 
14 going in that he got like at half price and was trying to 
15 find somebody to put it together for him, just a number of 
16 items that he was talking with me about, and he was, you 
17 know, concerned, and I says — he was putting a lot of things 
18 in I was noticing and I says, "How are you planning on paying 
19 for, you know, these upgrades, indoor pool, all this stuff?" 
2 0
 And he says, "Well," he says, "you know, I've got 
21 $150,000 on my credit cards. That's how I started my furni-
22 ture business," and he says, "And my business is real 
23 successful so I'll be able to pay for the rest of this, you 
24 know, through that." 
2 5
 And I says, "Oh, well," i says, "be careful because 
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you can really go over on these." 
And he says, "Yeah, I'm thinking about putting 
together the shower system myself and maybe I'll get some-
body," and his wife was really concerned and had chatted with 
me before he came about all this activity that was going on 
and with all these offers. 
Q (By Mr. Braunberger) Was there any discussion with 
him about the fact that Promax was going to build the house 
for him at some fixed fee? 
A Typically Promax makes 10 to 12 percent on a home. 
THE COURT: No. 
Q (By Mr. Braunberger) Was there any discussion with 
him that Promax was going to build that house for a fixed 
fee? 
A We were going to do him a favor and build the home 
plus $10,000. 
THE COURT: No. The question is, was there a 
discussion between you two or three at that time about — 
THE WITNESS: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Q (By Mr. Braunberger) Did he say anything like 
that? 
THE COURT: That's starting out leading, Counsel, 
(By Mr. Braunberger) I'm sorry. 
You said before that he was concerned about this 
306 
extra money you'd have to come up with. Did he say why he 
was concerned? 
A Just that it was difficult for him to turn down all 
of those upgrades you could get and you have a one-time shot 
at doing it because it's in the Parade of Homes and I mean, 
he was even doing some painting himself and I was talking to 
Phil and going, "This is going to slow us down to make the 
Parade deadline," you know, having him do this, and I told 
Phil my concern, "You sure this guy's going to be able to 
cover all this?" 
Phil says, "Yeah, he says he's going to be able 
to. " 
And I says, "I hope so." He mentioned he's got a 
couple of other sources for doing this. Like I said, you get 
great deals at these parades. I was concerned. We felt, 
because we built his partner's home, that that worked out 
fine, that this would, too. 
Q Okay. What was the basis that you built his 
partner Jim Beech's home? 
MR. SMITH: I would object, your Honor, elements. 
THE COURT: I would think more than that, it's not 
a matter that I can recall having been gone into on cross, 
Counsel, so I think it's beyond the scope. 
MR. BRAUNBERGER: I don't have any other questions. 






































An obvious answer, I guess: Promax is suing my 
correct? 
That's correct. 
You're being sued, Promax is being sued by my 
correct? 
That's what I've heard. 
Okay, and you do not want to lose a bunch of money, 
't not want your company to lose a bunch of money in 
this lawsuit, do you? 
A Well, I don't plan on it. I mean, yesterday I 
heard that we were offered that if we dropped, everybody 











I want you to stop right there. I want you to 
my questions, please. 
Now, you and Phil had a deal to build Matt 
's home for whatever it cost plus $10,000, correct? 
That's correct. 
And so there was no basic price, correct? 
That's correct. 
And you and Phil never talked about a basic price, 
? 
That's correct. 
So you never had any understanding about a basic 
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price of something around 190, correct? 
A I was told two weeks before and I'd asked Matt that 
he was getting a construction loan for 190. 
Q Right, but Phil never told you or Matt never told 
you that you were going to try to have a basic price of 190, 
correct? 
A Not that 1 recall. I asked him what his construc-
tion loan was for. 
Q Okay. Did you tell the truth when we took your 
deposition? 
A Yep. 
Q Okay. Could you please turn to page 23 of this 
deposition? I'm going to read what the attorney Allen 
Bouvedas asked you and then if you could please read your 
answer. 
A On which one? 
Q Line no. 2. 
A Okay. 
Q Line 6. "There wasn't a situation where you guy 
promised one price and all of a sudden he's paying out more 
money because of mistakes on your part?" 
Answer, please, line 9. 
A "No. As a matter of fact, when I talked with him 
about going over there were choices and decisions that he 
made for various upgrades and stuff, but that specific 
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1 question, I never heard anything like that if it happened, if 
2 it did happen." 
3 Q "Now, in Matt's house did they have a specific 
4 price in mind when they built his house?" 
5 A I don't know. 
6 Q Will you please read the answer? 
7 A "No, in Matt's house did they have a specific — " 
8 Okay. 
9 "Phil told me that there was a basic price that 
10 they were going to try to do this that they wanted to do it 
11 at." 
12 Q "What was that?" 
13 A "I don't know. The figure of 165 sticks in my 
14 mind, or 195." 
15 Q Now, I thought you told me — well, let me ask the 
16 question. 
17 Now, 190,200, that was the price they were going to 
18 do it at then; is that what Phil told you? 
19 A Yeah, that Matt wanted to do, that's what seems to 
20 stick in my mind or something like that. 
21 Q Did you forget that? 
22 A No. 
23 Q Why didn't you? 
24 A It was something like that. 
25 Q Well --
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A Okay. I was told what the construction loan — 
what he was shooting for, that that's what he was going to go 
to the bank and get the rest of it which you're — the attor-
ney didn't allow us. I don't know, for the record here — 
THE COURT: Wasn't the question, did he forget 
that, and he said no? 
MR. SMITH: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's proceed question and 
answer here. That's the only way we can really do it. 
Do you have a question? Ask him. 
Q (By Mr. Smith) I asked you if there was a basic 
price going in and you told me there was not just a minute 
ago, correct? 
A The basic price for everything, I don't know what 
that question means. For everything, for construction loan, 
for upgrades — a lot of people get a construction loan, sir, 
and then they put cash for whatever else they're doing. The 
only thing I know between 160 and 190 was a construction 
loan. I do not know if that was or was not the total price 
of everything that was going to be done. 
Q Why didn't you say that? Why did you say, quote, 
Phil told me there was a basic price that they were going to 
try to do this at and they wanted to do it at? 
A Sir, when they did my deposition, the lady — I 
don't know who you call it that takes notations there — 
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1 Q Court reporter. 
2 A Court reporter. When we were finished, my attorney 
3 wanted to clarify some points. It was the first time in her 
4 16 years that she's ever seen it done. Matt refused clarifi-
5 cation on some of these points. He got up and says, "We're 
6 done. We're leaving." 
7 And when they left she says, "In all my experience 
8 in 16 years of doing this — " 
9 Q Okay. 
10 A I'm just telling you, we've got to clarify — 
11 MR. SMITH: I object to the hearsay by this 
12 gentleman. 
13 THE WITNESS: It's not hearsay. 
14 THE COURT: What is happening here is we're not 
15 proceeding in question and answer form. First of all, let me 
16 inquire, have you got any further examination of this 
17 witness? 
18 MR. SMITH: Yeah, a couple of questions. 
19 THE COURT: All right. Now, what I want you to do, 
20 sir, Mr. Davis, is listen to the question and answer the 
21 question only. If more information needs to be brought out 
22 about it, that's where your lawyer comes in. 
23 THE WITNESS: Okay. 
24 THE COURT: All right. 
25 Q (By Mr. Smith) Okay. Did your attorney tell you 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: Good afternoon, counsel. This is the 
3 time set for ruling in the matter of Promax Development 
4 Company versus Matt Mattson, et cetera, case number C-95-3616 
5 In this matter both counsel are present, as is Mr. 
6 Bates, representative of the plaintiff corporation. 
7 The trial in this matter was conducted on the 15th 
8 and 16th of March of 1996. At the conclusion of the trial 
9 the matter was taken under advisement by this Court to 
10 further consider the testimony elicited, as well as the 
11 numerous exhibits received. I have now done so and am 
12 prepared to rule. 
13 The plaintiff corporation seeks a determination 
14 that the defendants breached an oral contract to the olaintif 
15 in that they failed to pay various suppliers and material 
16 men and failed to pay plaintiff's contracting fee. 
17 Alternatively, plaintiff seeks a judgment for 
18 quantum meruit or unjust enrichment in that the defendants 
19 received the benefit, it is alleged, of much more than they 
20 bargained for. 
21 Defendants deny there are any sums owing pursuant 
22 to the contract or that they received more than they 
23 bargained for. Indeed, they counter-claimed against the 
24 plaintiff, alleging that the plaintiff breached the 































cost, that the plaintiff did not fulfill the warranty of 
workmanlike services and that the defendants' prospective 
economic advantage was interfered with by the plaintiff or 
its agents. 
In addition, it is alleged by the defendants that 
they were slandered by the plaintiffs and that they are 
seeking herein punitive damages. 
Essentially every material point in this case is 
disputed by the parties. Consequently, this Court must, 
therefore, assess the credibility of the respective 
witnesses and examine the corroborating physical evidence. 
Having now done so, I am prepared to rule, and it is my 
ruling that the credible evidence establishes the facts as 
follows. 
The defendants were approached by the plaintiff's 
agent Bates with a proposal to purchase a home to be con-
structed at 6642 South Stone Mill Drive in Salt Lake County 
for the 1993 Parade of Homes. Pursuant to negotiations, 
the defendants applied for and received construction 
financing from Farr West Bank for the sum of $190,200, plus 
the one-half purchase price of the lot in question, an 
additional $29,000. Compare Exhibits 7, the appraisal by 
the bank, Exhibit 2, the construction loan approval, and 
Exhibit 9, the construction cost breakdown. 






1 closed the transaction on April 15th, 1993, for the sura of 
2 $190,200, Exhibit 10, the trust deed note, and Exhibit 11, 
3 the trust deed itself. 
4 Plaintiff claims the agreement was that the 
5 defendant would pay $10,000 as the builder's fee, plus pay 
6 for all supplies and labor supplied to the job pursuant to 
7 a so-called cost-plus contract, notwithstanding the financing 
8 documents with the bank specifying the price of $190,200 
9 for the construction itself. 
10 While the defendants during construction were 
11 intimately involved in the selection of materials and, to 
12 some extent, dealing with suppliers and material men, their 
13 involvement was no more than one might reasonably expect 
14 from buyers of a home under construction. The defendants 
15 were advised by Bates even up through the completion of the 
16 home that they were within their budget. They were not made 
17 aware of the massive overruns of some $170,000 until August 
18 the 15th of 1993, Exhibit 55, the final cost breakdown, which 
19 occurred at the completion of the construction. 
20 Essentially all of the contractors1 payment 
21 authorizations executed by the defendant Matt Mattson 
22 reflected the current loan balance was within the budget, 
23 Exhibits 16 through 20, and the updated construction cost 
24 breakdown, Exhibit 21. 
25 At all times defendants sought but were refused by 
Bates a written contract specifying the terms of the 
agreement, namely, whether it was a cost-plus or specified 
fixt cost contract• 
Mark Barraclough, the former loan officer of Parr 
West Bank who handled the construction loan, stated in his 
deposition that "we went in for a certain dollar figure to 
accommodate the builder and the borrower-" He further 
testified that in his 18 years as a construction loan 
officer, cost-plus contracts were extremely rare and he had 
only seen approximately six of them, and moreover, that he 
would not have authorized an arbitrary price for construc-
tion. 
Plaintiff asserts that the price of $190,200 was 
merely arbitrary to get things going, given the press of time 
to meet the Parade time table. 
When confronted with the overruns, defendants were 
forced to charge some $75,000 on their credit cars and 
exhaust their savings to pay the overage- At the completion, 
the home had a value of $390,000. At no time was there a 
writing that the loan amount was either estimated or 
arbitrary or indeed, that the agreement was cost-plus. 
Though plaintiff claims that the overage was due 
to the defendants' making changes in the original plans, 
Exhibit 12, not one written change order was obtained or 
produced at the trial. At no time until completion of the 
project did Bates advise the defendants of any specific 
overages. While plaintiffs claim the appraisal was based 
upon a smaller, less expensive home, plaintiff acknowledges 
the appraiser was never advised of this view. After the 
completion, defendants were able to obtain an offer from a 
ready, willing and able buyer to purchase the home for 
$560,000, Mr. Curtis Johnson, Exhibit 54 is the earnest 
money receipt and offer to purchase. 
On August 28th, 1993, realizing this would relieve 
their tremendous financial burden, defendants accepted the 
offer. However, when Bates was advised of this fact, he 
insisted, as a licensed realtor, that he be used as the 
agent to sell the home so he could acquire the commission. 
When told by the defendants that he would not be used, 
Bates told Matt Mattson he would "kill your deal." 
The next day defendants received calls from some 
six lienors that they were going to lien the home, even 
though no prior demands were made and defendants thought 
they were current on their obligations. 
Bates advised the defendants he had suppliers 
and/or material men file liens even though he knew no 
demands for payment had been made on the defendants. 
Exhibits 44 through 48 and 52 and 53, notices of lien. 
The potential buyer, when apprised of the liens, 
backed out of the transaction. 
On two other occasions Bates engaged in the so-callep. 
cost-plus versus fixed price bait and switch action. Rick 
and Martha Riley testified that after Bates's involvement 
with the defendants, they had Bates in 1993 build their 
home with the understanding that they had a fixed price 
agreement of $300,000. There was no written agreement. 
After the Rileys paid their $300,000, Bates demanded an 
additional $160,000 for extras. The Rileys finally paid 
Bates an additional $30,000 just to be rid of the problem. 
Bates had threatened the Rileys that if they did to him 
what the Ilattsons did, he would "burn them" as he had the 
Mattsons. 
^.va Kumaraa testified that Bates built his home 
before March of 1994. After closing, when everything was 
paid, Bates demanded more money. He harassed Kumaraa to 
the point where Kumaraa paid him an additional $600 again to 
get rid of the problem. Exhibit 57 is the cancelled check 
endorsed by Phil Eates dated August 12th, 1994. The Kumaraa 
budget was for $100,000 and the overage was an additional 
$13,000. There was again no written contract. 
After plaintiff completed defendants1 home, numerous 
deficiencies appeared which were brought to Bates's 
attention, Exhibit 67, within the one-year warranty period. 
With the exception of the faulty rain gutters, nothing was 
corrected. The cost of repairs is $23,000. Defendants have 
paid the various overages and the lineholders, Exhibits 
58 and 62, which are the lien waivers. 
The owner of the plaintiff corporation acknowledged 
in his deposition that he was aware that the "basic price was 
about $195,000f" while at trial he insisted that the contract 
was cost-plus. 
The testimony presented on behalf of the plaintiff 
is too inconsistent and contradictory to be persuasive. 
Based upon the foregoing, as well as the other evidence 
produced at trial, this Court finds that the parties had a 
fixed price contract for $190,200, plus $29,000 for one-
half of the lot price, for a total of $219,200. 
The defendants paid approximately $170,000 more 
than called for due to plaintiff's failure to keep them 
apprised of the overage, thus breaching the contract. 
Plaintiff has therefore failed in its burden to 
establish breach by the defendants. Moreover, the 
defendants have not received any uncompensated benefit. 
The theory of quantum meruit under either branch 
fails. This Court finds no cause of action on the 
plaintiff's Complaint. 
On the contrary, the defendants have suffered 
losses in the amount of $23,000 for breach of the plaintiff's 
warranties of proper workmanship and failure to timely 
repair the defects. 



































This Court further finds that Bates maliciously 
and with the intent to harm interfered with defendants' 
prospective econimic advantage by directly thwarting 
defendants' opportunity to sell their home for $560,000, 
causing damage in the amount of $170,000. That's calculated 
by taking the market value of $390,000, deduct it from the 
prospective sales price of 560,000, leaving the resulting 
$170,000 loss. 
Insufficient evidence has been presented to enable 
this Court to award punitive damages or damages under the 
slander 
judgment 
theo] try. Accordingly, defendants are 
against the 
' this action. 
Mr. 
plaintiff for $193,000, 
Smith, you prepare the Findings 




be in recess 
MR, 
there any questions? 






All right. Thank you, counse 
Judge, there was one question 




responsible for $170,000. I assume 




, and as 
that 
The $170,000 is the amount of 











I conclude that the parties received what they paid for. 
Therefore, in my estimation, there is no damage claim 
back for that sum. That's all the evidence has established, 
plus they get $23,000 for the unworkmanlike work that was 
accomplished, thereby resulting in the 193,000 total 
judgment. 
MR. SMITH: Thanks, Judge. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.) 
• * * 
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